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The Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Slovenia, Year II, No. 4, February 1992

- a. Sir.  
b. Yes?  
a. You are under arrest.  
b. No.  
a. You are under arrest, Sir.  
b. No.  
a. I shall shoot, Sir.  
b. No.  
a. I shall shoot, Sir.  
b. No.  
a. I shall shoot, Sir.  
b. No.  
a. I shall shoot, Sir.  
b. No.  
a. I hate you.  
b. No.  
a. I shall crucify you.  
b. Not so.  
a. I shall poison you.  
b. Not so.  
a. I shall murder you.  
b. Not so.  
a. Think of the winter.  
b. Never.  
a. I am going to kill you.  
b. As I said, never.  
a. I shall shoot.  
b. You have already said that once.  
a. Now come along.  
b. You can't arrest me.  
a. Why not?  
b. You can take me into custody, but no more.  
a. Then I shall take you into custody.  
b. By all means.  
b. allows himself to be taken into custody and led away. The stage grows dark. The audience feels duped and there are catcalls and whistles. The chorus cries: "Where's the author? Throw him out! Rubbish!"

( Kurt Schwitters, Anxiety Plays / A Dramatic Fragment )

The Interuder

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**The Intruder\*  
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Edited by: Dominique Cochard  
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\*The Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence was issuing information abroad from 1984 and has been publishing newsletters in English language from 1985 on: during the years 85, 86, 87 titled **Information Bulletin** of the Peace Movement in Slovenia and during years 88, 89, 90 **The Independent Voices** from Slovenia. In 1991 the meaning of the word "independent" got occupied by the state policy. We had to change the title of our magazine. It is now the second year of **The Intruder**. It can remain in the manifestation. with your help. Please keep in touch, send us a note, feedback, letters, money, love!

EDITOR'S  
**SELF TORTURE**

**A story  
about  
killing**

An alternative magazine. But what alternative? Alternative type of thinking?

Fourth issue of the Intruder: a viable pub-

articulate rational explanations, still conditioned by the XVIII century philosophy printing in our minds the clear distinction rational/emotional, objective/subjective, as the only way. Doing so, we set our minds at ease, persuade ourselves and others, but at the same time we loose an ability we all possessed as children: the possibility of naive questioning and the faculty of doubting.

In the look of certain people this quality of naivety represents for me an equivalent to the most provocative anarchy. For example: in the evening of July 14th 1789, Louis XVI wrote in his diary that there was nothing significant to be recorded concerning this day. Such men surely represent alive


them dead. Couldn't it also be a reason for being executed?

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because of their existence? One of the victims of this "instrumental persuasion" has been the American John C. Woods who was in charge of the execution of people condemned at the Nurnberg trial in 1946; four years later, he killed himself when "testing" a new electric chair. Who would say that it was just a question of professional conscience?

A French pilot returning from the Gulf War described on TV the fascination he experienced while bombing Irak: "it was like a Christmas tree, one of the most magical moments of my life".

**The categorization**

Who is right, who is wrong? Black/white are the colours of obvious opposition the most employed implicitly. Couldn't we also think of ourselves in distinction between red and white?. Both colours form a crew on the circus scene. The red clown, with a big red nose, enormous shoes and coloured clothes: he is always grotesque, making laugh at the cost of himself, his sufferings (falling down, receiving different disgusting stuff in the face...) being pre-condition to his funny role. The white clown, dressed elegantly with white silk clothes: he is cultivating insolence, irony, double meanings, the one who makes people laugh at the cost of others (at the cost of the red clown mainly), never hurt himself, keeping behaving in a distinguished way... In our needs of classification, we also could use this one. YPA, Tudjman, Milošević, John C. Woods, actors in general... would be on the red side, while the EC, the UN, the French pilot..., all sarcastic witnesses of their time who observe or win without threatening their freedom or their own person would be on the white one. According to the moral aspect, wouldn't it be normal to support the red side, which figures as the victim one?

Other possibilities to be explored  
Doors on intellectual stimulation and investigation to be opened  
Silence better to be kept sometimes

Dominique Cochard, February 14th 1992  
photo Damjan K.

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weapons, an act they are initiating, just

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**THE INTRUDER**

THE MAGAZINE ISSUED BY

THE CENTER FOR THE CULTURE OF  
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LJUBLJANA / SLOVENIA / EX-YUGOSLAVIA

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- Reflections about the political situation in ex-Yugoslavia
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- Peace initiatives and attitudes
- Interviews
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Return slip on the other side.

EDITOR'S  
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killing**

An alternative magazine. But what alternative? Alternative type of thinking?

Fourth issue of the Intruder: a viable publication? Anyway, once the question of survival overcome, it is possible to think more abstractly.

Are we offering a wide range of possible observations and understanding? Do we really have an ability to open new questions?

**The word**

Umberto Eco through his novel "The Name of the Rose" opened my horizon on the question: are things and events pre-existing to words and concepts in the human mind, or, is that the contrary? Does definition generate a new component or characteristic of the subject?

If the word "war" was not existing or simply, was not used, if this word wouldn't have so many implications in my conscience (through symbols, tales, family history, fictions...), would I make such a clear analogy between the Gulf and Yugoslavia, between technological killings and human reciprocal violent destruction, between post-modern times and middle-ages? If I couldn't use the word "war" wouldn't I put in parallel: an average quiet french man suddenly killing an arab in the street (This is called "racist crime"), a "good" father killing his neighbour in Croatia ("civil war"), Caïn killing Abel ("fratricide")?

**The perception**

Did we ever wonder what leads a human being to kill another one? Surely, we

articulate rational explanations, still conditioned by the XVIII century philosophy printing in our minds the clear distinction rational/emotional, objective/subjective, as the only way. Doing so, we set our minds at ease, persuade ourselves and others, but at the same time we loose an ability we all possessed as children: the possibility of naive questioning and the faculty of doubting.

In the look of certain people this quality of naivety represents for me an equivalent to the most provocative anarchy. For example: in the evening of July 14th 1789, Louis XVI wrote in his diary that there was nothing significant to be recorded concerning this day. Such men surely represent alive scandals. We prefer them dead. Couldn't we admit that this might also be a reason for which he has been executed?



**The observation**

We all agree on the fact that producing weapons is generator of war in general, wether economical or political reasons. But, we forget to watch the "weapon" as object.

Why not, for example, giving a role, among other responsible factors, to the persuasive power produced by a death's instrument as such, the fascination coming from its technical or artistic perfection? As well as we can't help eating certain cakes, or make love with certain bodies, why would we be able to refuse, when facing certain weapons, an act they are initiating, just

because of their existence?

One of the victims of this "instrumental persuasion" has been the American John C. Woods who was in charge of the execution of people condemned at the Nurnberg trial in 1946; four years later, he killed himself when "testing" a new electric chair. Who would say that it was just a question of professional conscience?

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Dominique Cochard, February 14th 1992  
photo Damjan K.

## APOLOGIES TO JAN ØBERG

In the last issue of The Intruder (n.3), we published an interview, supposed to give Jan Øberg's opinion on conflicts in Yugoslavia.

As it had been translated successively from three different languages, we were afraid not being totally faithful to the meaning, aware that the exact words could never be reproduced. Therefore we warned the readers about this fact. As we were in the final rush before printing (lack of time, money, and people being our basic conditions of work), we committed one of the most enormous mistakes regarding our duty: deciding to publish the text even though there was no time left for Jan Øberg to check it.

We apologize again to Jan Øberg and want to dissociate him from this text.

The Editor

The text published below is the exact reproduction of the part of Jan Øberg's letter in which he is expressing his disagreements about the content of "General selfishness and bad amateurism in politics", *Intruder 3*, p.15:

It is absolutely basic -and peace researchers know- that conflict-resolution people stay systematically neutral vis-a-vis the contending parties. Characterizing people like the "interview" does with words such as "selfishness", "amateurism", "introvert", "vulgar", is far from my personal and professional style and you find nothing like that in our report.

A series of arguments, said to be mine, are taken out of context -at best- or misunderstood completely, at worst. Readers only have to compare with our report -in which this article is not in any way a summary.

For example, I have not talked about "national sovereignties brought so much misfortune". It is grotesque that I am quoted as saying that "I don't

figure out any serious possibility of solution" when the purpose of the TFF mission was to look into the possibility of conflict-resolution and our report contains 75 proposals! Whatever is called the biggest mistake of the EC has nothing to do with the arguments in our report and relating this to the hypothesis that there might be a military intervention is faked.

The argument about the conversion of the YPA are taken out of context -demilitarization of all other fighting units too and new alternative defence structures- and the concept of balance of power is something I have actually written critically about for about 15 years and don't believe in.

Finally, it is also fun that you quote me for saying that "I am afraid that they (the UN) will reproduce the same mistakes as the EC". Our report was the first to argue for UN peace-keeping in a specified manner and as part of a larger conflict-resolution process in years to come.

Jan Øberg

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Language: Croatian- Monthly

# I DON'T TRUST A STATE WHICH HAS SUCH INSIGNIAS

By Zecchino d'Oro



Symbols of a state have no direct influence on the quality of life. Nevertheless, they are an incredible source of information about the nation/state, particularly at the level of cultural and social consciousness. They give a common frame inside and have a function of distinction outside. Moreover, they represent a kind of self-analysis.

Because they reflect the political reality, they change as often and radically as the states themselves. Europe of the 90ies is a real volcano of new and arising states. **How interesting, in fact, this euphoria of searching symbols of political and economical independence!**

#### The Slovenian case

Common historical coat of arms never existed, because, from the 16th century on, Slovenians were belonging to 8 different "countries". The first political unity in Slovenia appeared in 1918, and not before (Banovina of Drave in The kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovens). At the same time appeared the first real national all-Sloven coat of arms. The white-blue-red is historically justified as national symbol by the fact that it is taking its origins in the beginning of the 19th century (Province of Iliria), from the sample of colours represented on Kranj's blazon (1463).

During the second world war, the tricolour was used by the white guards, while communist winners put a red star on it.

After the second world war, Slovenia (and Yugoslavia) got its sign from the Soviet coat of arms, with a sheaf of wheat.

flags from the different republics of the former Yugoslavia. **The republic of Slovenia flung its new flag, just few days before the day of independence** (25th of June 1991), including new coat of arms which substitutes the former red star. (Coats of arms could be used, but have nothing to do on flags. Furthermore, coats of arms of the 20th century are signs). The elements of the new sign are: blue colour, three six-rays stars from heraldry of the count of Celje (it really associates with the EC) and the Triglav (the highest mountain of Slovenia). Shock. **The whole thing creates more the image of mass alpinism and collective syndrom of momentary historical-national ecstasy, than the one of a totally**



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**For the independent Slovenia, all this symbolic background brought quite big problems.** The traditional tricolour, on one side, has too negative connotations, on another side it was exactly the same as the russian flag; also, it was not creating a clear distinction with other tricolours, especially with



new state on "the sunny side of the Alps". **Before becoming anything we placed ourselves in the position of archaic fellow-travelers of a modern world.**

The selection of the possible coats of arms happened in a more or less secret way for the public, and especially for professionals. **The public competition was obviously only meant for the democratic scenario, the selection in the hands of non-professional. It opened a spectrum of banalities which culminated in the ejaculatio of the provisional money: Tolar-bons (what a sweet dollar sound-like name!)**

On the Tolar-bons (which have all the same image) is the inevitable Triglav, but besides, is figuring Prince's Stone, which takes its justification in the distant sloven history. **The only problem being that this stone is still located in Austria! Is that an (un)conscious desire of belonging to Austria? Does it suggest: if not Big Slovenia, then Big Austria!**

The Tolar-bon is quite as much as nothing. It was introduced by politicians, not by experts. It is the direct continuation of the Dinar: it is good to control and plan the economy, including the inflation! Real catastrophe. Because of this, the visual image of the Tolar is not surprising at all: it reflects the value of our goods and achievements. After all, couldn't we say that it is too well designed? **Everything suddenly became provisional, expected to be ruined, already insipid when still at the state of project.**

We are expecting real, new banknotes to appear mid-92. But the everlasting question is: does it make any sense to design well a bad "product"? But these new Tolars will surely bring optimism to Slovians, won't they?

The whole story doesn't exactly end up with this point. The Slovenian policemen made their own

symbol themselves, totally divergent from the state's ones. This is such a clear demonstration that guys possessing arms are always representing a state in a state.

# SLOVENIAN ECONOMY AFTER THE FIRST YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Slovenian independence was not meant to become an isolation. But it turned other way around. Commercial exchange with other parts of Yugoslavia - which involved a major part of partners for Slovenian economy - did almost disappear. Not because Slovenia would wish to end the cooperation but because of disabled transport due to the war in Croatia and because of inability of south-slav partners to pay for imported goods. They are not in position to pay even if they would want to keep the exchange going.

**The loss of Yugoslav market is and will remain the main characteristic of the first and most probably of few more years of the economy in independent Slovenia.** It does not concern only the export but the import as well. The difficulties in supplying goods from former Yugoslav republics resulted in decrease of export of Slovenian producers to European and world market. The major innovation in slovenian economy was therefore introduction of "lohnarbeit" - completion and after-treatment arrangements - with producers from the Western Europe and Northern America.

Reduced market resulted in reduction of production, which decreased in 1991 for 20% comparing to average production in 80-ies. **Increase of unemployment has followed now reaching 15%. This is a real shock for Slovenia which did not face more than 2% unemployment for years.**

**The second characteristic of the initial period of Slovenian independence is the incompetent state.** A number of cognizances particularly in the field of foreign trade, international monetary exchange, local monetary and exchange-rate policy Slovenia inherited from former Yugoslavia. Besides, the new state bureaucracy lack experience which makes its work even more stumbling. The



former fact affects also the re-establishment of relations with former Yugoslav republics. These states with which Slovenia until recently shared the state bureaucracy do - still - not *de facto* represent foreign countries. Many agreements such as agreement concerning external payment, trade cooperation and double-taxing arrangements must yet be signed. This is it in a nutshell to illustrate the amount of work to be done in a short time - **a morsel just too big for any of the new states.**

**The incompetency of the state bureaucracy is complemented by growing ambitions of the same.** For the first time slovenian bureaucracy founds itself completely independent dealing with the budget. **The result of it is a budget-crisis due to inability of the parliament to agree on the 1992 budget.** The proposed budget estimated 55% share of GNP for public

services. This can only be compared to those few originals as Netherlands, Sweden and Israel and is far beyond any comparison with those states of similar rate of income per capita (cca. 4.500 US\$). Even Slovenian parliament - often enough chaotic to swallow up problematic proposals - had to refuse such intention.

**In addition slovenian economy will have to face the problem of abolition of state-property through the process of (re)privatization.** The process - which was recently interrupted due to fights between political parties - would significantly increase the motivation of the management as well as of foreign capital.

**The incompetent state bureaucracy reflects also in non-productive jealous relation between the ministry of finances and the central bank.** The former is not subordinated to the government but to the parliament. **This results in a schizophrenic situation when domestic currency (Tolar) is convertible and at the same time submitted to high inflation.**

Janez Kopač, Member of the Parliament (Liberal Democratic Party).  
Translated by M.H.

## WE SHOULDN'T BE TOO SENTIMENTAL ABOUT EX-YUGOSLAV STATUS IN SLOVENIA

Interview with Dr. Jože Pučnik

### The Intruder :

*How could you define a security complex in the new born state of Slovenia ?*

**J.P.** In the postwar period two very rigid distinctions were put forward in most of the debates about peace and security in Slovenia, which in my opinion are merely based on the ideological and terminological delusion. Namely, in the discussions "peace" and "security" appeared as two different concepts with no conceptual inter-relations. I do not agree with such an approach. For me peace and security represent only two faces of the same issue or concept. In order to develop a peaceful society, we have to build up our own security in all its aspects : from being able to defend ourselves on the national level to the development of the other forms of people's security. Those, that are for peace (but we are all for peace) should not oppose to the defence of a country and those, who are establishing the national security system should do that in order to achieve peace. **It is necessary to overcome such ideological distinctions within the "peace and security" complex. We should explore it in its complexity and here I see also one of the possible aims of your Peace Institute.**

### The Intruder :

*In the situation of a deep economic crisis, unemployment, social tensions, ethnic conflicts...the effectiveness of a national security system in Slovenia in my opinion depends more on the Slovenian citizens and their perception of the social, economic, ecological.. security, that is so radically threatened. From this aspect the military threats against the Slovenian state seem to be more and more unrealistic and apparent. Could you make a distinction between the military and other : social, economic, ecological...determinants of our security ?*

**J.P.** After the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from the Slovenian soil, a direct military threat in spite of the war



**The former president of the Democratic coalition - DEMOS, which won the first anti-communist elections in 1990. The coalition fell apart in the beginning of 1992, just after the international recognition of Slovenia as a sovereign state. Dr. Pučnik is remaining on the political scene as a president of a Social-democratic party .**

By Dora Lešnik, Peace Institute

in Croatia, was reduced to the point, where we should start to see the Slovenian national security in a different light. The military aspect of a security more and more belongs to the past. **Our further attention should be given to the repressive apparatuses of the state, which are becoming more and more powerful and independent.** I think that also on the issue of a national security there shouldn't be any holy cows and secret spaces. The only rule, that is followed in a democratic society is the rule of a law. We have to establish strict mechanisms for controlling the structure, ways of activities and financing of the repressive apparatuses of the state. In our hard economic situation we should provide money for the Ministry of Defence and Internal Affairs in the relation to our economic abilities and to the estimated real military, external threats to the Slovenian security. Here I see a very strong connection of the military aspect of the national security with other determinants of it. **I believe, that in a longer term Slovenia should be included in a European Security System and I would prefer having on our territory a demilitarized zone, Slovenia without an army.** A security of such a small state can not be achieved through the military means but with the strong cooperation with other countries and on the basis of the international, in our case, European Security Arrangements. **The necessary conditions for the demilitarization of Slovenia are : recognition of the state of Slovenia not only in the European framework but also in the United Nations, recognition of its borders and involvement of Slovenia in a collective European security.**

### The Intruder :

*How to promote the idea of the demilitarized Slovenia in the situation when the Ministry of Defence is efficiently building up a Slovenian national army and has quite a strong support in the public opinion and in the parliament ?*

**J.P.** The Ministry of Defence should finally bring to the parliament the "right" issue, which is: the estimation of a real military danger against the Slovenian state, supported by the facts and fig- »

ures, which kind of weapons do we need for the defence, how many soldiers, which buildings, equipment, how much money....? **These things should be clear and public in order to be discussed by experts, politicians and all interested people. A Slovenian army is not a holy cow, which shouldn't be touched.**

#### The Intruder :

*One of the most important aspects of the political and social stability is the level of the legally assured human rights and their implementation in the society. Human individual and collective rights ( for the Italian and Hungarian ethnic minorities ) , which are written in the Slovenian new constitution, are comparable to the level, which is exercised in other European societies. But what about the legal status of other minorities - social, sexual, ethnic ( Non-Slovenes from other parts of a former Yugoslavia ) ?*

It is true that in each society different marginal social groups exist and their identity; social, gender, sexual is not legally properly recognized. But the members of each such group are constitutionally protected as citizens and individuals. As far as the rights of Non-Slovenes are concerned we should differentiate between those, that are the citizens of Slovenia and those, that do not have this status. People from the first group have the same rights as Slovenes and others are protected according to the special law for foreigners as foreign citizens, who are working in Slovenia. We should not mix these two different statutes and **we also should not be sentimental about this questions. If we, in the past, lived in the same country, it does not mean that "ex Yugoslavs" need to have a special status in Slovenia.** What we should absolutely follow is law. The only relevant criterion for us are the criterion of a constitutional state. **We learned from the past that an artificial "brotherhood" that existed in Yugoslavia did not bring cooperation and understanding among the former republics. Therefore, another approach is needed in order to provide justice and order.** This will be also a proper ground for the real cooperation, based on the mutual interests, which should develop between the newly formed states on the territory of a former Yugoslavia. Such a cooperation is one of the aims of the Slovenian external policy.

## INCUBATOR OF NEW LIFE

by Sašo Gazdić

Military barracks are material parts of state's body. They are its harder parts - skeleton. Some people are sure that the collapse of subjectivity is the final moment of life. But, can we be convinced that death of Yugoslav ideological basis and, so, its subjectivity, means in the same time the death of the body parts? Concerning the time we are living in it is not excluded their fractal lives will go on living, particularly if we know that all diminished images of Yugoslavian body have their own skulls, as Slovenia has one in the command barracks on Metelkova street.

In the nature we are reckoning for incontestable proof of death the moment when material starts to organize itself according to new genotype. The moment when, for example, flower begins to grow out of the corpse. If, contrarily, the organism just splits itself into more parts, as it happens in cell development, and if it follows the same genotype, then we are sure it lives on.

Therefore, I would like to answer the question: Is the genotype which will organize life in former military command on Metelkova street only continuity of old one or the new one?

#### Criterion of arms

I maintain that using the former military command building as a weapon means the continuity of changes as a development. In this case we are still on the road of modernity and the building will be used against enemy. Although it's nearly clear that Slovenian army will not force, at least into most urban spaces (Metelkova street is in the centre of Slovenian capital Ljubljana), we can not reckon for essential changes if the police or administration of justice will move in. This Slovenian government's intention shows only the wish to continue the fight against states (inner) enemy - in this case crime and criminals. It would make a little difference if schools or culture would get it. But not necessarily if the purpose would stay the same, if they would be used just like an instrument for defending national identity. The sea snails house stays the sea snails house even if the crab is living in it. And that could be also the trap for Metelkova Network.

If this building would, on the contrary, be in service of connection (not separation), if it would become spacely, institutionally and spiritually open, if it would not, in a word, be used as a weapon, then it would be possible to close it as a new nature.

Which are in fact differences between old genotype and this one which Metelkova Network intends to transplant on barracks fenotype?

Inwards: First system exactly measures out to the individual the place in space, time and hierarchy, it describes symbols and prohibits imagination, whereas the second leaves all of them open. First is extremely expensive, lavish and inward barren, whereas the second is cheap, profusion of unforeseen contacts between individuals produces abundance of material and symbolical goods.

Outwards: First system is closed, its output are disciplinary and frustration for individuals. The second is open, its material, symbolical and spiritual products are destined for as wide public as possible. Old genotype radiates relations based on domination and, as we can ensure ourselves just now, in extreme cases, pure destruction, whereas the new one aspires to coexistence with environment and produces also creative atmosphere.

#### Is Metelkova Network a weapon?

Surely it is possible that new forms of life which is breeding in Metelkova Network incubator, will not be essentially different from the old one. The use of existing elements, from which this incubator is built (and which can not be created from nothing) is, undoubtedly, risky. Even the fact that we have used elements which ought to give as much space for original initiative as possible is not a guarantee. Subcultural and civil fights tradition, as well as institutional frame are giving possibility for using them as arms. (It was, for example, impossible to register officially the network without paragraph in statute where it stays: "Network is ensuring all activities for national security and constitutional regulation of Slovenia") Therefore, handling with this device must be very careful and subtle. Otherwise it can be converted in its own contrast. It is necessary to avoid temptation of being (too) combative towards the external system and, in other hand, of planning and arbitrating (too much) inwards. Refusal to aspiration of absolute foresees and yielding to simultaneous reflections, valuations and solving problems are indispensable preliminary conditions.

Only abdication of using weapons is assurance for essentially different type of life between the barracks walls, in town and Slovenia as a whole.

## Conditions and Elements of a Peace Process

By Josef Binter, General Secretary of the European University Center for Peace Studies, Schlaining-Austria

The cold war is over -and the world has not become more peaceful! After the euphoria of the moment, the day to day paralysis seems to be encroaching, mixed with feelings of powerlessness and resignation. **Have peace research, peace movement and policies for peace failed?**

The end of the cold war and of the East-West conflict have been viewed by most peace researchers as an historic turning point, bringing about both chances and challenges. Thus it should have been clear, that the cold war could be replaced by something "better", but also by something "worse": in short, peace through democracy -or violent conflicts due to nationalism. If the latter is happening now within the transformation processes of East-and Central Europe, then this is happening quite often because quite a lot of politicians cover up

and divert from their incompetences and helplessness in regard to the current and upcoming economic, social and political problems by instigating nationalist ideologies.

For one of the essential forms of the (old) East-West conflict, ie. the "Western" as well as the "Eastern" universalism, were both in the same way averse to nationalism. Thus, with the end of the

East-West conflict -hopefully- the danger of an all-European hegemonic conflict has waned, but the once looming threat of a "big war" has turned into the sad reality of everyday violence "just next door". Especially where some atrocities that happened to our neighbours in Yugoslavia are concerned, the question comes up, how blind and destructive rage could blow up to one extent, where it seems to have already far surpassed its original grounds (discrimination of nationalities, minority protections, etc)? It seems almost as if the same "acceleration of time" which we have witnessed at the end of the last decade, has on one hand swept away the top of peaceless structures, while at the same time -due to its very pace-making it impossible to "fast enough" build up long-term institutions and mechanisms that are necessary for a civilized handling of conflicts. These

institutions and mechanisms would be "cornerstones" of a peace culture, where war as a social institution could be banned in the future just as it has been the case with slavery and the feud in the past. What is here referred to as "peace"- or "conflict culture", would as a matter of fact not aim at the avoidance and prevention of -many times necessary conflicts, but provide for an as much as possible non-violent handling of conflicts and an early "prevention" (Burton) of such conflicts which could escalate to violence and war. And that kind of conflicts are themselves quite often based on structural and cultural conditions of violence incompatible with "positive peace", since they deny or hamper an essential potential for human development.

Obviously it has reappeared in Yugoslavia what peace researchers at the times of the East-West conflict have described on the level of inter-systematic confrontation: the emergence of "security dilemma" which in this case do not appear any more on the level of states and military blocks, but on the level of communities and ethnicities).

Summarizing a recent paper of the Scandinavian peace researcher Hakan Wiberg, one could in short describe the Yugoslav crisis as follows:

- One people tends to see itself as the state-carrying one, but is actually only the biggest minority group in the state (Serbs)
- Another people insists on either sharing the state-carrying role or opting out altogether (Croats)
- Some relatively rich peoples want to live altogether (Slovens)
- There are some underdevel- »



Pablo Picasso, Peace, 1952, Vallauris

oped Muslim parts (Kosovo)

- Boundaries inside the federation were largely drawn on the premise that the existence of the federation made their exact location unimportant.

- If the union is dissolved into its individual parts, that leaves sizable parts of the state-carrying people outside its own republic (more than 3 millions Serbs, more than one third of them all)

- In some nationally mixed republics (Bosnia), the populations are intermingled that there is no practicable way of dividing them up in uni-national political units.

Where the issue of secession and boundaries -the cause of the conflict- is concerned, there seem to be two contrasting cases:

1) In Slovenia, only a few percent of Slovians live outside Slovenia and only a few percent of Sloven inhabitants are non-Slovians. Boundaries should hardly become a problem, if secession is agreed.

2) In Croatia, by contrast, there is a sizable Serbian minority (600 000 people, 12 percent of the population in Croatia), a great part of which forms a local majority in the part of Krajina.

Here the issue of secession becomes almost inseparable from the issue of boundaries, leading to a deadlock situation.

"The Croatian government insists both on an independent Croatia and on that being the present republic of Croatia (or even inclusion of Croat-inhabited in Bosnia and in northern Serbia).

It is impossible to yield on either demand without risking a coup d'état from even more fervent nationalists. The local Serbian population in frontier areas insist on not becoming part of an independent Croatia, asking Serbs elsewhere and the government of Serbia for support.

The Croatian government is in the following dilemma: it cannot get Croatia out of Yugoslavia without abandoning some predominantly Serbian areas; but it cannot abandon these areas without risking its political life (or more)! On the other hand, the government of Serbia must support the local Serbs in Croatia to safeguard its (!) political life; if not, these Serbs are anyhow likely to resist to the bullet". (1)

The notion of "security dilemma" during the cold war era was an expression for the objective or perceived incapacity of one state or military alliance to have certainty of the "real" intentions of the other part, and thus always to have depart from a "worst-case"-thinking.

"Security" in that context was perceived as "holding one's own" by mobilizing proper power-resources, while striving for delimitation and incapsulation, which in turn had as consequences a "pathological-autodynamics" of fear (Senghaas), fear-projection, competitive arms-building and enemy fixation.

So it seems as if in Yugoslavia the same kind of problematic auto-dynamics takes place, only this time at an intersocietal and/or intra-state level. Maybe it would be possible therefore to apply certain praxeologies of peace research that were elaborated in an inter-state context characterised by the East-West conflict -such as confidence building measures, "common security", unilateralism, gradualism, etc..?

So far peace researchers have argued for an inter-systemic co-evolution and "common security", now the far more complex task would be to lay theoretical and practical foundations for a "multi-national" co-evolution and "common security". There might even still be hope that the civil war in Yugoslavia would lead to a "dead end", because more and more soldiers would just leave the armies and national guards, or that a peace movement would form itself as "civil society from below" and by hundreds of activities for non-violent conflict resolution enforce a change in thought, policy and action of the people in charge. Nevertheless it seems necessary, however, to start thinking and acting also in a long-term perspective.

**Which theories, concepts and experiences of peace -and conflict research could be made applicable and constructive regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia, or on the other hand, what could we learn from this crisis for our goal of a more peaceful Europe?**

I will try here to sketch some basic principles, approaches and core elements of such a peace process.


### 1. Approach the problem without presumption and simplification

Taking into consideration the experiences so far, the complexity of the crisis would call for a differentiated perspective which avoid any thinking in categories of black and white and also stays aloof of any attempt to achieve seemingly fast and clear "solutions" with military means; a perspective, according to which the "bad" is definable and tractable always and anywhere, and could easily be battled with the adequate and reliable military means, is

surely not appropriate; for part of the problem is exactly the fact that in most cultures of the world, recourse to military violence is an "accepted" option, which in turn seems to block any outlook for more constructive possibilities. Our societies and cultures unfortunately take the risk for a military security policy much more readily than the "risk" of peace-policy. This risk of a military security policy has become obvious in Yugoslavia with a development that started with the establishment and armament of "each own's", territorial mili-

tary in Slovenia and Croatia and escalated with the occupations and inroads on the side of the "national people's army". At the moment it is exactly the danger of nationalism and militarism, as it is currently becoming most obvious on the Serbian side, which calls for a differentiated reaction that takes into consideration the complexity of the problem.

Teshigahare: The Sun Wheel



## 2. Participation, Equality and Symmetry

Without symmetry and fairness in regard to all parties to the conflict, and their involvement and participation with equal rights, responsibilities and duties a peaceful solution will hardly develop. Therefore there may and cannot be "second-class" parties (ie. the Albanians in Kosovo, for instance). Symmetry, however, would also mean that each of the sides is ready to grant "their"

As main actors in this process rather than the EC, institutions with a more comprehensive set-up such as the CSCE and the UN should become more active, since the Yugoslav crisis concerns not only Western Europe. Yugoslavia is already a member state of the CSCE and the UN, and it is to be expected that any future yet to be created mechanisms for international conflict resolution would be built within the framework of these comprehensive institutions.

## 4. Future orientation

Even if realistically a peace-plan will have to depart from the fact, that "Yugoslavia" as such does not exist anymore, any attempt at solving the issue will have to take into consideration the given realities of intermingled populations in a nationally mixed geographical area. Serbs, Croats, Macedonians and Bosnians will also in the future have each other as neighbours.

Any approach to peace will have to lie in the future and not in the past. Such an orientation towards the future might, without "suppressing the past" be capable to accept and "endure" differences, this attitude being the modus vivendi for "peaceful coexistence". Out of many and various blueprints for a common future that kind of "meta-option" might accrue, which without constituting a menace to any of the parts to the conflict best reflects common future interests beyond all contradictions.

## 5. Needs-orientation

Ethno-nationalist mobilizations, as they have emerged ie. also in Yugoslavia, mostly become immanent when the "protection of possessions and positions", and the rejection and defence against "foreign infiltration" and "coerced assimilation" are at stake.(2)

However, this mechanism is in principle based and dependent on basic economic, political and cultural interests. The core of such a conflict is therefore competing strategies to regain and/or secure "life-chances" (ie. language, economic welfare, self-development, perspectives for identity formation and development). These basic needs, which certainly set the criteria for any peace order, have been characterized as follows by Johan Galtung in his broad notion of violence: survival needs, well-being needs, identity, meaning needs and freedom needs.(3)

minorities the same rights as they claim from the other side for "their" ethnicity or countrymen.

## 3. Primacy of inner-Yugoslav dialogue rather than "pacification" from outside

The role of "third parties" should at first be focused on the promotion of an inter-Yugoslav dialogue as a priori foundation for a comprehensively accepted "peace-plan".

## 6. Self-determination "without limits" in the framework of democracy

If it holds true that there are no alternatives to "self-determination", then it must in the long term come about without "vertical" and "horizontal" limits and without creating new "delimitations": which means self-determination and its recognition as a right and duty not only for the republics, but also for the minorities living therein (eg. the Croatian government has to evenly grant to its Serbian minority, what it demands "one level higher" for the republic of Croatia in the framework of "Yugoslavia"). This would in turn imply that in the future "self-determination" should be viewed and determined both as an individual as well as a collective right on various levels which in principle can only be realized in the framework of democracy.

## 7. Dis-"Etat-ize" national self-determination/de-territorialize "nationhood"

One should as a matter of fact not overlook the fact that in Europe democracy has been realized above all in the course of the establishment and constitution of nation-states. Less and less, however, in our time- and space-transgressing industrial society, in the era of international complexity and interdependence is nation-state "sovereignty" thinkable as a total and indivisible one. At the end of the 20th century the nation-state has lost more and more of its "sovereign rights" to higher supra-national and lower communal entities. It also is less and less capable by itself to fulfill these already mentioned basic needs for security, welfare, freedom and identity, which are also a crucial factor in many nationality conflicts. Apparently this objective development contradicts the subjective desires of certain nationalist movements, where a "state of their own almost automatically" would fulfill the needs and promises for "status-protection" and "identity-defence". If it is to be prevented in the future, that "national" conflicts almost automatically convert into "territorial-military" ones, one could have recourse to the theories and proposals of the Austro-marxists concerning the Danube Monarchy. Expressed in short: "nationality" should not be strictly defined according to a certain territory, but should rather become operative more on a personal level ("cling" with consti- »

tionally guaranteed rights to a respective person). According to eg. Karl Renner, a far-reaching "de-territorialization" of "nation" should take place which could in turn be replaced by the establishment of "nations" as "personal-associations" and collective legal subjects with quasi state-competences.(4)

### 8. Peaceful co-existence instead of "autistic escalation-dynamics"

Another mechanism at the level of "international politics" that could serve as a model for peacefully dealing with conflicts would be the principles and experiences of the CSCE process which could be applied at the "intra-state" or regional level of Yugoslavia. For the daily growing security dilemmas can be step-by-step decreased only through the creation of "reliabilities of expectation" (2), and Confidence Building Measures based on armed control (this would in the first place imply curtailment and control of the military apparatus of the conflict-parties. It would have been very desirable to prevent the conflict from turning into "autistic escalation-dynamics" (Senghaas), which becomes almost insoluble from inside: this is a major part unfortunately already seems to have happened in Yugoslavia. This "autism" is characterized by incapsulation, fixation to enemy images, cut off of communication, narrowing of intellectual horizons as well as irrational and fearful warding off of the "other", which supposedly might destroy one's own identity.

### 9. Transformation of "identity-conflicts" into conflicts of interests

What would be the main point in such a stage, would be to use the well-considered support of a third party (UN, CSCE) to "empower" the conflicting parties to liberate themselves from the perceived fixation of non-soluble identity-conflicts and regress this again to the level of negotiable and reckonable conflicts of interest. To learn such a "constructive culture of dealing with conflicts" would mean in the first place to attempt to see the context, in which certain problems find their expression, as one that is changeable and capable of change, so that basic conflicts of interest not immediately lead to "autistic blindness" and emotional self-reference characteristic for identity conflicts.

### 10. Peace Keeping as a first step towards "peace making" and "peace building"

Of course, all these ideas and proposals have two preconditions: the will and the possibilities to engage in long term, comprehensive, and fair negotiations, during which as a matter of fact the fighting must stop. From today's perspective, if one wants to secure that precondition, military "peace keeping" might have to be taken into consideration as necessary precondition but not as substitute for "peace making" and "peace building". If at all military measures should play a role, then they should be carried out rather in the framework of Europe as a whole (CSCE) and not from parts of Europe dominated by states with significant historic burdens regarding that area. Where the peace keeping measures of the United Nations are concerned, they are at the moment based on a legal "improvisation" somewhere between Chapter 6 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter 7 (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace...). There is no doubt about the necessity to use this instrument in a more flexible and broad manner also concerning the so-called "intra-state" conflicts, which in the long run would make necessary to improve and extend the legal and political bases of this principle in the UN charter.

### 11. Towards a con-federation with "border-transformation"

Realistically speaking there are no conditions existing right now that would enable the preservation of any kind of Yugoslav federal state. What seems possible still is a loose con-federation model where every part has its own foreign-finance-and security policy based on non-offensive structures (the loosest kind of con-federation would be the model of the Benelux-states). Based on and departing from a recognition of the status-quo, future border-changes might become a topic in the negotiation process, while it is to be hoped and expected that these future "borders" along with all European borders at that time will become much more open than they are now between many states in the world. While it still seems necessary to acknowledge the fact of "borders" so to speak as a "necessary evil", measures of practical politics towards a pan-European perspective should or will at the same time transcend them to an extent where state-borders might

have lost their character as "military borders" in favour of approaching the status of merely "administrative" borders.

### 12. Nationalism and European Peace Order

What can be concluded after the events of 1991 for the perspectives of a "Future European Peace Order", which should still be on the agenda? One of the main principles of the CSCE, to both in principle respect territorial integrity but also agree to the right of self-determination (which in this course mostly implies the change of given borders) seem at first sight to contradict themselves; in any case, both of these principles are only executable in a peaceful manner and in the frame of democracy as has last been mentioned in the 1990 Charter of Paris, which as a step further could be complemented with a special Charter for minorities (Group Rights) in Europe. In the spirit of these above mentioned principles a peaceful Europe should understand itself as being more than just the sum of territorial states; in such a Europe, which does not totally abolish the traditional nation-state but rather "stores" it within supra-regional structures, new formations and political units such as eg. "autonomous territories", "federations and associations of nationalities" which would allow for the justifiable national aspirations at hand, would have their political existence and relevance assured.

#### NOTES

- (1) Hakan WIBERG, "Divided Nations and Divided States", Working Paper 11/1991, Center for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen.
- (2) Dieter SENGHAAS, Therapeutische Konfliktintervention in Europa, Juni 1990, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
- (3) Johan GALTUNG, Cultural Violence, in Journal of Peace Research 3/1990, pp. 291-305
- (4) Egbert JAHN, Die Bedeutung der österreichischen sozialdemokratischen Nationalitätentheorie für die gegenwärtige Nationalitätenproblematik in Europa, Manuskript, Mai 1991, Frankfurt am Main

## RELIGION AND THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Tonči Kuzmanić, political scientist, faculty for social sciences, Ljubljana

The present war in Croatia has opened a lot of questions. Among other problems, there is an important one concerning the ideological question of the interpretation of the War. More exactly, the question of "the nature of the war" lasting in Croatia for several months.

One of the relatively less present interpretations is actually based on the following question: whether or not this War could be understood in categories of "religious war", as War between two, three or even more religious communities? Of course there is a lot of indications and symptoms, especially at the level of the use of religious symbols, according to which it could be possible to claim that the War in Croatia is a "religious one":

In the everyday pictures of the War given by the Belgrade or Zagreb television, one can daily observe soldiers from various armies or milices, ornamented with the rosaries, sometimes even tanks, different types of military vehicles or cannons are decorated with similar religious symbols... Priests (not from the very beginning, but latter, especially when the War became "more serious"- during the battle for Vukovar), catholic and orthodox, used to give masses on the frontlines or somewhere near the battlefields; they are blessing weapons as well as soldiers who are going to take part in future strifes against enemies.... Leading persons from both churches (including catholic archbishop and orthodox archiepiscopal) from the very beginning took part in the War, first through different forms of speeches dedicated to "christian love", later on, more or less through the symptomatic silence... Among the most important targets for Yugoslav People's Army, for various semi-private "serbian armies", and milices from several "independent" serbian Krainas (states) in Croatia, used to be churches and other sacral objects.... According to some estimations, approximately 160 churches in Croatia have been destroyed during the War in 1991.

There are also symptoms showing elements of the so-called "imperial War" (occupation of territories).... And so on and so forth. Anyway, in this paper I would try to work out some elements for possible pro et contra argumentation concerning the question whether or not this War could be interpreted as a "religious war"?

#### Oppression and self-oppression

It is very important to notice that discourse and customary interpretations of so different religious situation, outside as well as in former Yugoslavia, used to fall into specific and **symptomatic problems**. Generally speaking there are two important points regarding the religious situation in former Yugoslavia: 1. exclusion of religion from all segments of the so-called public life and by that also from the public discourse and from the discourse about the public, and 2. reduction of complex religious situation at the Catholic-Muslim-Orthodox triad.

Of course it is possible to explain the first point with the quite large accepted and sometimes "useful", but analytically extremely dangerous, ideological complex derived from the "communism" and with the grip of the so-called separation between state and church. In other words with rather simplifying, more ideologic than scientific grasp regarding the communist repression over the religious communities.

But the second mentioned point, the specific "triad-discourse" emphasizes the fact that at the level of discourse Catholic, muslim and Orthodox religious communities used to work as a representation or better as a **reduction and even castration of extremely diversified religious situation**. To put it differently, specific reduction worn us about the repressive potentials and activities coming not only from the communist state and party apparatus, **but also from the three dominant religious communities themselves**.

Catholic-Moslem-Orthodox leading triad was dominant, in reality (empirically), as well as in differ-

ent forms of ideological discourse **before communists and communism came in Balkans**. It is possible to present the whole history of religious oppression in this part of Europe as an oppression among members of the dominant religious triad. Next, and in my opinion the most important aspect of this problem is oppression which came from the "Big Three" and which was turned **against other smaller religious communities**. In this context the communist or better Yugoslav system of self-management, as a sort of anti-religious movement-system, lasted just less than half a century, was just an episode in a very long history of quite hard religious strifes in Balkans. Mainly between Catholic and Orthodox churches as institutions with quite strong interest connections with different institutions, organisations outside of the state (Vatican, Moscow...). It is not mere chance that Vatican as a state was among first states who recognized slovenian and croatian independence. Similarly it is not by accident that commencements of orthodox clergy and different other speakers ("Pamjat" organisation, for example) too, from Moscow are trying to explain us "jeopardizing" of Orthodoxes and Slavs in ex-Yugoslavia.

#### Religion, Nation and State

One of the central problems concerning Yugoslavia's way of "decommunisation", of the transition from communism to post-communism is concentrated at the point that almost through whole history (at least until 1929), it looks so that in the Balkans existed only one nation, with several tribal names within One and not more Slavic nation. So, each single slav nation or Yugoslavs (Yugo meaning south) **were forced to keep their own hindered, thwarted national identity through religious and not national conviction**. The result was and still is rather primitive sort of medieval, old-fashioned religious "consciousness", through which in a quite absurd manner, southslavic nations distinguish themselves regarding different religious convictions. In other »




words the function of the religion is twofold: as a factor of preservation of national identity (especially in serbian history) (1), and secondly, as an element which, during the history, used to **block autonomous national development, relatively independent from the religion (church)**. Just this situation is the reason why different national movements/structures, which has destroyed Yugoslavia, are more or less religious or in religion "soaked" movements/structures.

The impossibility of a "western type" of nation building processes (2) in the past is entirely easy to grasp, not solely in times of Venice, turkish and austro-hungarian empires, but also in the twentieth century when One nation (serbian) ideology was predominant (especially between 1929 and 1941) (3).

### Tito's time

The situation was similar in Tito's state. but Tito's Yugoslav nation was not a nation anymore in the sense of "the people" as such or community connected by blood, language, common market.... It was literally a **"working nation"**. In conformity with more than terrible national and religious strifes in Balkan history, Yugoslav communists have tried to avoid similar events in the "new society" they have started to build. They also had in their hands relatively useful experiences from the Second World War, but simultaneously they made other mistakes. in order to escape from religious and national collectivist type of conflict production, they have established a new one: social or socialist. Instead of opening a window towards the individualisation, they threw out even those forms of individualisations which arose in the partisan War circumstances which by definition were full of individual actions and culture.

The "socialist" problem at this stage was not concentrated at the point that many different peoples of Yugoslavia differ in their roles as political subjects, in their ethnic composition, that "the people", in the sense of **demos or plebs** and as political subjects have lost political influence and meaning in the Yugoslav constitutional system, while the nations and nationalities (na-



René Maltête

tional minorities) have become the main political subjects. Rather, individual, individuality, as apolitical subject or being was suppressed.

"Political" existence as such was not individual but collective, and first of all in the meaning of sub-states (republics) system inside of Yugoslavia as a "mega-state-system" and not in the way of "People" or "Nation". To be Sloven or Serb **proletarian as a non-political being**, a being reduced at the working level (homo laborans) from which whole corpus of rights have been derived. Precisely from this point of view, it could be possible to observe, if not to explain, two basic problems of the previous state. Firstly, there were a shortage of citizenship and the absence of human rights(4). Secondly, a specific oppression of national identity which was -similarly as religion- pushed aside of public sphere or of sphere which has replaced the political space (mono-party system as such).

In other words, throughout the centuries, two structural "spheres" of society, religion and nation, were oppressed in a similar way. The not "normal" (in the western european sense)

development made impossible the disconnection of those two elements or spheres and their separate existence. In the eighties we witnessed specific kinds of **implosion** of civil society and at the end of the eighties we suddenly sought an explosion, or more exactly, **revolution of the same civil society**, which overthrew the old system as a whole. due to those facts in post-communist Yugoslavia have appeared **two structural elements or even forms of oppressed society (still inseparable!): nation and religion**. And, if adding to this kind of structural situation the fact that different religious divisions in Yugoslavia were only partly the same as national divisions, and even less as republic/state borders (5), it is easier to explain today's war and its religious implications.

### Two types of "abandoning" communism

The decisive distinction between two different kinds of national movements in Yugoslavia, among Slovans and Croats on one side and Serbs (Montenegro as well), is that

these movements in Slovenia and Croatia were in the opposition, thus taking **the form of anti-communism**. In Serbia and Montenegro, the national movement was imposed from above, from the communist leadership itself (Milošević). Therefore, the anti-communist national movement in Serbia and Montenegro had little possibilities and less space for developing a strong, or even anti-communist position. In addition, one of the consequences of this **interior national paralysis** was the "production" of the extreme form of the anti-communist national movement in Serbia. Namely national assault on communism (as a non-democratic, totalitarian, dictatorship...) was not enough, so national ideology has sought much deeper in history. Authors such as Čosić, Drašković, Šešelj... found it in the existence of the Serbian medieval State and Church, in Serbian mythology, especially in these periods of the history in which the Serbian nation and Serbs were "victims" of other nations in Yugoslavia (preferably of Albanians and Croats). the result was an **extremely backward "nationalist ideology"**.

Searching for and developing of the hindered, thwarted national identity, they mainly talked of blood, church and medieval rulers (6), and victims. The outcome was that the formed post-socialist Serbian national consciousness remained without "real answers" up to the present days, serbian questions and problems which resulted in a war against Croatia (first of all, regarding the question of actual Serbian national-socialist leadership). In Croatia a similar process went on, but in a more democratic form. democratic, of course, in the meaning of anti-communist national block, which won the elections and established a strong right wing, populist national policy, symbolically and empirically, based on the majority rule principle. In both situations, churches and clergy played an important role in nation-building processes. The case was similar in Slovenia, where christian democrats won elections and established the first post-communist government.

### The end of Yugoslavia

Due to the absence of possibilities for "proper national identification" (lack of state identity) different ex-Yugoslav nations replaced it with an identification based on religious beliefs. In that meaning religious adherence was and remains being a sort of "compensation for state identity". The question whether the War in Croatia could be interpreted as a religious one or not lead to a **negative answer**. This war surely contains in itself suitable strong religious elements, but not decisive for it. They are part of a larger entirety, firstly of the nation-building processes, secondly of the building of nation-state structures and finally they work as elements of a larger entity which only could be comprehended as a terrible war.

However, after the war in Croatia it is obvious that one logical and historical circle in the growth of Yugoslavia is concluded. The Yugoslav state as a "common house" of different nations, national and cultural minorities, religious communities based on the cement of communist concept of "organic community" becomes obsolete. Moreover, Yugoslavia became an obstacle for the possible (?) development of the parts from which it is constituted. Strong centrifugal forces overthrow any possibility of "normal", common living. Perhaps it would be possible in the future, but after this War, probably not before the XXI century.

### NOTES

(1) Even more could be claimed in today's war situation when Montenegrins (and Macedonians) are trying to defend or, better, to develop their own national identity, not through religion as such, but with the help of the autocephality of Montenegrin (and Macedonian) Church regarding Serbian Orthodox Church.

(2) Just this impossibility as such was, of course, constituting a part of "normal" or western european type of nation-building processes.

(3) Both, Austrohungarian and Serbian monarchies were religious states, and in both, there were dominant nations (Germans and Serbs).


(4) Although Yugoslavia was not a proper example for this explanation, also in this country one could observe diminution and rejection of human rights at the conceptual level, namely, as a "bourgeois" one.

(5) In Yugoslavia, it is possible to observe two different problems. First there are different nations which "belong" to different religious communities. For example Slovans and Croats are catholic by faith, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians are orthodox, Albanian, Muslims (in the meaning of nation) and Bosniacs are muslim by faith. But, Albanians as a nation are at the same time "members" of three different religions: Islam, catholic and Orthodox. Besides, and that is the biggest problem, "members" of different nations -with Slovans as an exception- have not lived within the borders of the same republic/state of the former Yugoslavia. Nation-state building processes literally have destroyed previous social and "political" system based on the balances among nations, religious communities, different other minorities, and above all, on the ground of communist party-state pressure.

(6) The lack of the "modern" national ideology in the serbian nationalist movement results also in an extremely dangerous form of declaration of **Holy War** against Muslims (Albanians and Muslims from the Serbian Sandiak) and Catholic (firstly Croats).

## The Point Zero of Subjectivity

The impact of disintegration on the position of women in Yugoslavia  
By Vlasta Jalušić



Victor Brauner: La Fracture de la subjectivite, 1951

"Nobody cares about anything in the case of women in Serbia", told me a friend of mine, woman writer, whom I asked to explain me a little bit more about the actual situation. "Even not in the sense of trying to eliminate women's formal rights, because they are lost at any case."

When asking myself how to grasp the so-called "position of women in Yugoslavia" few years ago, I would be confronted with one, probably not unusual difficulty: namely, it is impossible to write about "women in Yugoslavia" as a unique "field". I would probably start with describing of broader historical, political, cultural, economical and other differences which resisted the 45 years unifying socialist system and were actually growing bigger and bigger. I would speak about six republics and two autonomous provinces, about big differences, not only between men and women, but also among women from different republics, regions, nationalities, religions, not solely about wage differences between men and women, but also about the gap between women from southern and northern parts of Yugoslavia..., about the 23.3% of illiterate women in Kosovo (ex-autonomous province with the Albanian majority population, where Serbian regime destroyed all legal Albanian institutions) »

and 0.9% in republic of Slovenia, etc... Anyway, I have much bigger troubles now. In fact, at the time I am writing this paper there is no more Yugoslavia as a common state of six republics and two autonomous provinces. There is a war going on in the republic of Croatia. Some parts of former Yugoslavia are proclaiming themselves independent states, some of them are trying to preserve "the rest" of it as something they want to call Yugoslavia in any case. There are deep strifes about the question of how the people should live (separated or together) in this area in the future. Yet there would probably be many women from some parts of the former Yugoslav territory, claiming that my opinion is not adequate and that there still exists something like Yugoslavia. In other words, somebody living in the republic of Slovenia should not have the right to write about "Yugoslavia". **Therefore I can not describe broadly the "position of women", but only write about the last "common point" of Yugoslavia: the disintegration and its existing and possible future effects on women's lives and rights.** I cannot offer any certain new statistics, because at this moment, nobody works on statistics concerning the position of women. My starting point is somewhere between past and future, where everything is difficult to define, where nothing is certain, except the uncertainty of the future developments.

If at the beginning of eighties, it seemed that the main difficulty for women in different parts of Yugoslavia would be the so-called "transition" from the socialist system and state or self-managing economy to the market system, which women in all ex-socialist countries were facing at this time, now it is clear that it was not the main problem. Namely the situation is much worse than expected. I would not like to spend too much time by describing rather well known facts concerning a quite good legal position of women in former Yugoslavia (after the Second World War): connected to special ideological premises of the role of "women in socialism" and not to the concept of women's politics, of course. The very common assumption, both in the everyday's experience in the socialist system and in the "political-theoretical" (official) explanation of the so-called "position of women" in the society was the following: there is a women question, which is actually not a "separated" one, but only a part of a broader "social question". The women in our country enjoy equality, at least formal equality, there are only some

corrections at the level of actual position of women necessary (social measures) and perhaps at the level of consciousness, and we would solve the women question.

However, this position of socialist "state feminism", which, it is true, has grown out of some kind of movement and was the core of the ex-allembicing socialist women's semi-autonomous organisation (Anti-fascist League of Women from the Second World War), abolished in 1953, having succeeded in forming a relatively equalising system for women, above all as a social equality: the main achievements were in such areas as employment, social care, public care for children, parental leave, reproductive rights. Only for illustration, the area of reproductive rights has been founded in the constitution of 1974 in a paragraph about the "human right to decide over the birth of one's own children"(1). In different republics, the declared rights were realised to different extents, not without the influence of religious differences, differences of tradition and the level of development... Though we know that the data of the average amount of employed people in Yugoslavia being women was 39%, the concrete data was: in the republic of Slovenia 46%, in Croatia 42%, in other republics between 35 and 37% and in Kosovo 22%, **then it must be clear that we have had the differences which can be compared with the world North-South differences. So, even before, no average statistical data could explain the position of "Yugoslav" women** (the paradox with this name is also that Albanian women are not "south Slavic"). **The very special issue was the question of the political representation of women**, which was - compared to the employment - very low on the higher posts. because of the special characteristics of the so-called self-management system, the decision-making net has been rather non-transparent, and the number of women delegates in the so-called "delegate system" was at the beginning of eighties 26%, but was not the right indicator for their political activity and influence.

The mentioned "state feminism" persisted in some form with a perceptible influence at the decision-making level until the beginning of early eighties. Then it has lost its influence and legitimacy. Loosing its influence was a consequence of changing the whole system and growing economical difficulties on the one side, of starting process of disintegration of the whole

state and society on the other. The legitimisation of the special social politics, connected to the presupposed special women's role in socialism has been "useless" for the period when a new concept of market system was introduced. Besides, all changes were very closely connected to the growing nationalism, which showed how fragile women's rights and formal equality can be, if there is no longer tradition of women's movement, independent women's political forms and no public women's political conscientiousness about the meaning of these rights. The dominant "new democratic" discourse about women started to claim the 40 years "forced emancipation of women", which has presumably destroyed and terribly socialised the family. On the other hand, a very strong ideology of progress and praise of "democracy and human rights" was and still is at work. **In spite of this, there is no questioning of the term "democracy", which is as a majority rule used as a covering for every possible action or argumentation (including the war).** There emerges a paradoxical situation, where one might work out the argument for both abolishing and restore certain human rights.

Nearly 40 years of absence of an organised women's network have had tragical consequences on the legal and empirical position of women after the first post-socialist elections in different republics. The old socialist legislative came first of all from "above" and was not the result of long-lasting political battle from "below". **It seemed as if the good father or mother state (in most of the languages in Yugoslavia, the state has a female gender) brought a present, "social" legislative to women, without numerous women participating actively in struggles for it.** The political issue was reinterpreted as the question of the "social" and covered by the "imposing" social solutions without raising the questions of women's position as a political one. And, in spite of a certain number of independent women's position and feminist groups existing from the middle of seventies, there was mainly no powerful basis to influence the changing old and (if at all) the forming of the new laws, when the power changed. Namely, Yugoslavia had in this sense an advantage compared to the other socialist states: open borders, which allowed an early impact of western women's movements. Several groups appeared at the beginning of

eighties, mostly in centres as Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, among them rape crisis centers and academical groups.(2)

Onward, in the last few years the financial and social position of the majority changed in worse and strong militarisation took place. In the middle of the eighties we could see the pictures of women from Macedonia fighting for bread at one shop's entrance. We can hardly imagine the Kosovo situation in 1991 where no schools in Albanian language exist anymore (and where even before, until the beginning of eighties, only 46% of girls finished the primary school), where health care has lost professional point of view, where women give birth to their children either without professional medical help or have to pay high amounts of hard

lawless situation appeared. After more or less democratic elections in the single republics, where national or nationalist parties won the majority, only very few women got into republics' parliaments (under socialist conditions all over Yugoslavia there were from 10 to 25% women in various assemblies): in Slovenia 11%, in Croatia 4% and elsewhere less. In most of the republics, the reproductive rights were left out of the constitutions. Especially in Croatia, a very strong anti-abortion campaign, which took place before the war began, had as effect the abolition of the individual right to decide over the birth, by leaving it out of the constitution and introducing the right of physicians to "conscientious objection" as a constitutional right. (3) In Slovenia, the reproduction rights were left in the new constitution as a "freedom", but only after

rights, but also with something which could be called "bringing the society back to the state of nature" in order to be able to build up a completely "new" system. And that is the main characteristic of revolution, especially of those ones, which are connected to violence. In the case of former Yugoslavia we are confronted with war, in which we are, *volens nolens*, both actors and observers. **Again, once more in the history, we are witnessing violent disintegration of state, political mechanisms, of what is called social structure and its connections. This inevitably involves changes and suffering in the real lives of individuals, individual women as well as the redefinition or rebuilding of the "category" which is called woman.** This redefinition is going on at all levels of acting, judging and speaking. **And the common question I see as a problem for women in former states or rests of this state, regardless to the specific positions and differences is, how to come to terms with the situation, where women in few years changed from the semi or quasi "social" subject (women workers) to the "natural ferment" of reproduction of life.** Namely, in a society where only questions of survival appear, there is no real space to make politics.

## NOTES

(1) In the republic of Slovenia, for example, this right did not only include abortion rights (on demand until the 10th week of pregnancy) but, first of all, the social, health

and other facilities to enable to give birth to desired children. This included the whole net of women's health centers, accessible (free) contraception, abortion on demand, payed out of the health insurance. Not to speak about the health care for mothers and children, and other social facilities.

(2) And at the beginning of the war in Croatia, in September 1991, women's groups from the whole territory of Yugoslavia were the first peace initiators at the level of the so-called "civil society".

(3) Recently, two women journalists went to the central women's clinic in Zagreb pretending they want to make an abortion and were told that this clinic does not make such interventions any more.

(4) You can read in details about the recent situation in Slovenia in this regard in Intruder 3 "The reappearance of civil society?", by Marija Melodić.




photo DVuga

currency. Meanwhile, one can observe pictures of women (in Croatia), joining military volunteers, on another hand more than one million refugees all over Yugoslavia and out of it, partly deserters, but mostly women and children. And again, in Slovenia for example, you could see pictures of women organising charity work.

**The loss of autonomy in Kosovo and Voivodina, the independence of some republics, the disintegration in some of them and in the rest of Yugoslavia brought not solely economical and social consequences, but above all, the loss of fundamental human rights.** After abolition of the federal constitution in different republics some kind of

long campaigning and a large demonstration of many women's groups. (4) In Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is no discussion about the position of women at all: but simultaneously, it is obvious that, especially in war circumstances, they took over the main burden of reproduction of life.

It is quite clear that the new nation-states do function so to speak "over the female body". A new nation-state needs its national body and women to reproduce it. It devises women in "ours" and "theirs". This ideology operates now in its most rough form. We are not only faced with the large changes and turn over of the different spheres of political, social, group or individual lives and

# WOMEN IN SERBIA

Staša Zajović

The militarisation of former Yugoslavia has meant the imposition of military values, symbols, and militaristic language; a cult of necrophilia (expressed in slogans such as "the frontiers of Serbia are where Serbs are buried"); and the acceptance of political and moral totalitarianism. Along with these ideological shifts has come a rigid separation of masculine and feminine roles — in short, woman as mother and man as warrior — and the political marginalisation of women. **Belgrade feminist STAŠA ZAJOVIĆ comments on how language, ideology, and power have been used to control women and reinforce nationalist mythology.**

Throughout the postwar period, concern over women's social condition in Serbia and Yugoslavia has been reduced to an obsession with keeping up the working-class birthrate.

As nationalism replaced class struggle as the basis of political discourse in Serbia, this obsession with reproduction was transferred to the nation. With the 1987 "anti-bureaucratic revolution" [led by Slobodan Milošević] a strange sort of sisterhood began to show itself on the streets. Huge crowds throughout the country shouted "we want arms" — in a sort of collective trance, united in hate and the desire for vengeance for Serbia's "offended nation-hood".

In tandem with the cult of blood and soil, the new Serbian nationalists also summoned to life the symbolic mediaevil figure of *mother Yugovich* — the long-suffering, brave, stoic mother of nine, offering her children up to death in the defense of the fatherland. Maternity is now to be seen as an obligation, not as a free option for women; the sexuality of women has to be controlled and reduced to procreation.

## **Kosovo: the demographic counter-revolution**

Serbia's demographic slump has been described as "one of the greatest tragedies of the Serbian people" in particular in light of the "demographic counter-

revolution" — the perceived threat posed by the Albanian women of Kosovo province, who have the highest fecundity rate in Europe.

Serbian repression in Kosovo has as one of its objectives a reversal of this demographic gap. This has been seen in increasingly militarist (or "national security") terms. The structures of militarised power now insist that the birth-rate must grow so that the nation might defend itself in military conflict with other people.


And women are to be blamed for any shortfall in this sacred mission: "I call upon all Serbian women to give birth to one more son in order to carry out their national debt" stated one politician. Another, Rada Trajković of the Association of Kosovo Serbs, was even more explicit in viewing mothers' sons as cannon fodder: "For each soldier fallen in the war against Slovenia [June 1991] Serbian women must give birth to 100 more sons".

## **Political pimps**

The manipulation of women by the military establishment began some time ago; but the clearest examples are found in the rallies held by the "Women's Movement for Yugoslavia" (linked to the pro-military parties, and formed in 1990. In February 1991 the women of this movement publicly lent their support to the JNA, saying that they considered it the only force capable of saving the country. The women have been used; the military hierarchy carries out the function of "political pimp", putting women on the street to give their approval to ends which are contrary to women's own interests.

This text is also published in  
**PEACE NEWS, March 1992**

Before the massive wave of mobilisation for civil war, there were warnings in some parts of the country — such as Montenegro, known for its martial traditions — that men should be prepared to give up their lives for the fatherland and that anything less would be a blow to their masculine dignity. Men were expected to follow national tradition, whereby "in war not one Montenegrin man can be protected by a woman."



One parliamentarian stated that "we in Montenegro believe that a man who is fighting at the front and allows himself to be hauled back home by a woman should commit suicide at once." This perception that women were preventing men from fulfilling their national duty was reinforced in radio broadcasts from the Dubrovnik front, in which a high proportion of Montenegrins were involved. Soldiers would send greetings to their fathers, brothers, and male friends, but not to their wives or girlfriends.

## **Rejecting manipulation**

Happily, the number of men who wish to free themselves from this macho war culture is growing, and more are not ashamed of being protected by their mothers, wives, and sisters. A committee of women was formed in Montenegro in October 1991; "We raise the voice of protest against the private war which those in charge are making from their offices. They have sent their sons out of the country and on to the tennis courts, while our sons carry on being carried by force to the front and to their graves. We demand that these demented leaders, politicians, and members of the military resign immediately in order to save this country."

ber "occupy the administrative jobs, communication services, health, stores. We are simply replacing the boys who have gone into combat. But we too have passed the military entrance exam and we can help the boys at any moment."

A small number of Croatian and Serbian women fighters have gone to the front and have been rapidly converted into mythical figures, confirming what patriarchal history teaches us: that women enter history only when they have taken on masculine roles. The media celebrate these women as heroines when they kill the enemy; when women fighters from the other side are captured they are denounced as "monstrous women" and the like.

The first female battalion of the war was established in Glina, a Serbian-majority town in Croatia annexed to the Serbian autonomous region in December 1991. Members took the oath "we will fight against all of the Serbs' enemies under the protection of God" and heard male officers declare sentiments like "if our mothers should not have been heroines, they would not have given birth to such valiant children."

Patriotic women also fight on the "home front", of course. In Belgrade, women knit socks and gather winter clothing to keep the boys at the front warm. The pro-government media fawn on every evidence of maternal mobilisation, at the

same time ridiculing the work of women in the anti-war committees and centres.

We feel it is clear that the majority of women are on the side of peace. They are convinced that they can offer the historical female alternative; nonviolence in place of violence, life in place of death, vitality in place of destruction. Stana Pavić, an elderly refugee from a Serbian village in Croatia, told me that "we women ... should have united like them [the military] — we could have made a peace accord in no time at all."

Women members of the Serbian militias in Croatia do not occupy important positions in the military hierarchy. The frontline is for the men; the *knidze* or female militia, in the words of one mem-

## **The mothers' movement**

With the end of the war in Slovenia in early July 1991, human rights — above all, the right to life — lay in ruins throughout Yugoslavia. In such a situation, women burst on to the political scene, demanding the right to live. On 2 July, a parliamentary session in Belgrade was interrupted by several hundred parents, mostly conscripts' mothers. This was the first civil society initiative against the war in the federal capital, and the first to protest against the abuse of women's reproductive work by the state, nation, army, and party. "Men are the controllers of the war and of our sons. We do not give them permission to push our sons forward to kill one another."

As a result, the very role — reproduction — which marginalises women in their private lives has had the effect of converting them into active participants in the political life of the nation. So the patriarchal divide between the personal and the political is weakened; the personal has become the political in this war. The mothers' movement has contained all the ingredients for a militarist's nightmare.

On the other hand, the mothers' movement has been subject to different types of manipulation by political structures. A part of the mothers' movement has been used — both in Serbia and Croatia — for patriotic propaganda. It is easy to exploit the sentiments of mothers whose sons' lives are in danger. The soldiers' mothers at times feel confused, internalising the struggle between the "patriotic" sentiment which underlies official propaganda and the desire to save their own sons.


Yugoslav women have been linked together in a feminist network since 1987; they have managed to maintain solidarity and plan joint activities ever since, rejecting the conditions that support policies of divide and rule. Over the past four months normal communication has been almost impossible, with the cutting of telephone lines, post, and transport between the republics. In spite of such practical obstacles, feminists — Serbians, Albanians, Croats, Slovenians, Hungarians, and Montenegrins — are united in organising against the war. Joint and simultaneous protests, such as the weekly "Women in Black" demonstrations, are a product of this unity of purpose.

Translated to Spanish by the author;  
translated from Spanish by Juley Howard

## A EUROPEAN LEBANON MAKING OR A REPUBLICA OF PAKISTAN / INDIA DRAMA

The text reproduced here is a part of a longer article, which is going to be published mid-april in the book which working title is: "Yugoslavia: disintegration analysing", advertised in this issue of *Intruder*.

There is no doubt that some highly optimistic dreams about the transition from a communist society to a post-communist one have been lately dreamed off. And particularly in the case of Yugoslavia which not so long ago seemed to be the first one to make such a transition in the most easy and quick way. Primarily as a transition from old collectivism, already eroded, to a



CITY CENTRE OF BEYROUTH. "The Lebanese are today very far from all the mirages which have led them to the war"

new individualism already growing up as well as a transition from weakened and weakening authoritarianism to new democratic anti-authoritarianism. or the first one to make a rather easy transition from a not rigid state controlled economy, generating a society of scarcity, to a free market economy producing by a short cut a society of prosperity and affluence just behind the corner. There is no doubt more particularly that an over-optimistic dream of solution of

By Srdjan Vrcan

Ph D of sociology, Split

Yugoslav crisis along the lines of the so-called Scandinavian model has been recently dreamed off. The recent turn of events has made the Scandinavian solution highly improbable, and that for some major reasons.

First, owing to the fact that the existing hostility and hatred along national and ethnic lines have already attained such an extend and intensity that a peaceful and mutually agreed and freely consented to a solution along the Scandinavian model has become an illusion. Imposed and inforced solution comes to be the only feasible one,

of exacerbated conflicts between Croatia and Serbia and if Serbians and Croats would mutually act as arch-enemies, not being able to live peacefully in any kind of common association or good neighbourhood. It is highly improbable that a political philosophy would be efficiently functioning by consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina, assuming that Muslims, Serbians and Croats may live peacefully side by side in a Bosnian state as equal and free citizens, while the whole ex-Yugoslav area is being politically reorganized upon the contrary political philosophy of the formula "One nation, One state, one faith, one language, one flag, one national political philosophy, one national television and broadcasting network, raised to a cathedral of the national spirit, one national truth, one true national political party, one leader or father of the nation, etc", and assuming that there is no possibility of living together in a democratic, peaceful and equal way in any kind of political community or any kind of association of Croats and Serbians. Consequently, the explosive charge of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not going to be dismantled or substantially reduced in the near future.

It seems more realistic to fear that the eventual solution of the Yugoslav crisis by partition would follow at least partially another well-known model with contrary connotations, i.e. the model exhibited on the Indian sub-continent in dismantling the British Dominion of India. (1) **It is the model which led to the creation of two new independent states of Pakistan and India, both obtaining quick universal international recognition as independent states, both entering the UNO and both becoming members of the British Commonwealth. Unfortunately, all this did not prevent the two new independent states to wage at least two major wars in the meantime with hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded, with a mass of people fleeing from a side of the border to another, many of them being driven by force from their native homes, with occasional massacres of civilians on religious and ethnic basis, and finally, with the new state line, dividing the new**

but it remains very precarious, projecting the existing conflicts in future and generating new future conflicts. Second, owing to specific position of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seems very clear that **any partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be as difficult as a partition of a leopard's skin and certainly would create more conflicts and lead to widespread hostility than eliminate and resolve them. At the same time an independent republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would hardly be a durable peaceful solution if the area would be characterized by perpetuation**

states, turned practically into a front line on some sections of which guns have never been silent since partition and with specific regions becoming areas of permanent interstate crisis and of perpetuating armed clashes and conflicts. **Consequently, it is more promising in order to anticipate probable consequences of a solution of the Yugoslav crisis by partition to take into account developments in the Indian sub-continent than developments on Scandinavian peninsula more than a century ago.** It seems very realistic to predict that a solution along the Indian model could be applied, but it would result in recourse to arms and in perpetuation of hostility and conflictuality with almost permanent walking on the very brink of war for the years to come.

There is another historical experience which ought to be taken into consideration. It is the Lebanese experience.

Let us underline only some crucially relevant points in that experience.

First, the Lebanese experience demonstrates that "a state of things which persists has a tendency by generalizing to establish itself it may become a way of life and even to organize itself in a social system". (2) It is evident that the same is valid for a prolonged motion in direction of a war, or for protracting march upon the very brink of war or preparing for a war have their own logic and it turns the war, being prepared or being waged, into a functioning social system or a way of life, covering tendentially the whole of the society. **Therefore, playing a political game with war and peace is not an innocent political game which may be abandoned at any chosen moment with any consequence.**

Second, the Lebanese experience, which is the longest modern experience with a civil war in an ethnically and religiously mixed area, indicates that the preparation to wage a war and/or walking a long time upon the very brink of a major war, the end of war and establishing durable peace becomes a very complicated and difficult affair. In substance, peace under such circumstances is not simply the end of war and least of all the end of shooting and of open hostility. Ahmed Beydoun concludes that "elevating itself to the dignity of a social system, war becomes less and less comparable to different ruins it has produced or to anomalies it has imposed upon thousands. A consequence of this transformation is the

fact that peace could not be anymore a pure end of war. It has to be no less and more but replacing complex and progressing of a system by another one". (3)

Third, the Lebanese experience shows that it is wrong to expect that "peace, whatever its formula may be, would bring immunity against a return to war. This is evidently a nonsense: the system of war should be patiently dismantled since it is nothing else but a way of the actual organization of the Lebanese society. Another system ought to replace it." (4) Therefore, it is not rational and promising to expect that "establishing peace is to be a matter of belligerents". Moreover, A. Beydoun warns that it is erroneous to suppose that "belligerent forces are those which should supervise the instauration of a new system". (5)

**Finally, the Lebanese experience shows that political**

analysing the Lebanese situation, concludes instructively: **"the Lebanese are today very far from all the mirages which have led them to the war. They are far from the national dignity and sovereignty of the state. They are distant also from an equal participation of all in government and from justice in prosperity. They are far from enjoying an authentic "citizenship" in context of a democratic regime of freedom of their "retrograde" traditions. They have even lost a large part of their old liberties."**

Only a freely agreed and consented solution by all parties involved would offer a perspective for a durable peace and stable pacification and normalization of social life as well as for genuine democratic developments in the area, but such a solution is very unrealistic to



**strategies oriented to wage a civil war or to prepare for such wars and in fact making the war a way of organization of social life, are at the same time doomed to be self-fulfilling and self-defeating.** Namely, preparation for a civil war in an ethnic and religious mixed territory usually ends with enhancing the chances of war and leads to actual war conflict, and it does not in long run reduce or eliminate the danger of war or armed conflicts. At the same time, such political strategies easily leads to a state of things which is to a high degree contrary to initial expectations. A. Beydoun,

Osijek, CRO, 1991

expect under current circumstances. An imposed and enforced solution - which seems more likely - upon any party in conflict would not eliminate the remain essentially unstable and precarious with a new round of recourses to arms being prepared behind the curtain.

August 1991

### NOTES

- (1) The author of these lines formulated such ideas in September 1990 in a public debate on the book "Četvrta Jugoslavija" (Fourth Yugoslavia), written by Slaven Letic, later reported by the weekly "Nedjeljna Dalmacija".
- (2) Beydoun, Ahmad, op. cit., p 604
- (3) Idem, p 588
- (4) & (5) Idem, p 602

## STATEMENT AGAINST CONSCRIPTION IN VOJVODINA

**These statements come from Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina, via the Hungarian Human Rights Office in New York**

We consider it the height of hypocrisy, cynicism and anti-democratic behaviour that, in the middle of a lasting ceasefire, when the arrival of peacekeeping forces is only a matter of days and members of the rump presidency, along with the President, Prime Minister and other leaders of the Republic of Serbia, as well as the high command of the one-time Yugoslav People's Army, are all talking incessantly about peace and ending the war, the conscription in Vojvodina has intensified and thousands are being taken to the front.

The Serbian mobilisation effort continues to be directed primarily against Vojvodina and within it, the areas inhabited by opposition groups — and therefore affect the communities where minorities live.

It is our firm belief that the Serbian Party in power and the one-time Yugoslav People's Army are manipulating the mobilisation device as a form of punishment and brutal retaliation against the opposition and the minority. The newest measures are evidence of this intent, as a result of which further hundreds and thousands of Hungarians from Vojvodina are being forced to take refuge abroad or go into hiding at home, following in the wake of the more than 25,000 who have already fled their ancestral homeland.

Since the beginning of the war, the Hungarian community of Vojvodina has consistently made its position clear: it has no desire to take part in this dirty,

fratricidal slaughter and it deems unlawful the mobilisation orders issued by the rump presidency. Its representative organisation, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina (VMDK) — which, in terms of the number of seats it holds in Parliament, is the second largest opposition party in Serbia — has taken this position publicly on numerous occasions, both domestically and in front of the international community. In the spirit of Helsinki, we declare: there is at present no political problem in Europe which could only be resolved through warfare.

It is outrageous, therefore, that despite the above, the Hungarians of Vojvodina — who wish no part of this internecine warfare and who have urged peaceful negotiations from the very outset — are being drafted in disproportionately high numbers.

The latest large-scale mobilisation campaign is having a particularly adverse effect on the representative organ of the Hungarian minority, the VMDK. Previously, draft notices had already been received by one quarter of the organisation's central leadership, several leaders of the western-Bacska (Bac) regional chapter and others. This time notices were sent to two Vice-Presidents of the regional chapter in Szabadka (Subotica) and the Vice-President of the Ada chapter among others.

In our judgement the authorities, maintaining the false pretence of upholding democratic principles, are trying to obstruct the activities of our organisation not by outlawing it but by resorting to this devious tactic. The same purpose seems evident from the recent sharp increase in the number of wholly unfounded slanderous attacks, unwarranted belligerence and threats against the VMDK and its leaders by the Party in power and its fellow travellers.

It is outrageous that while leaders of the VMDK chapter in Szabadka (Subotica), for example, have been drafted — people who from the beginning advocated peace, urged peaceful negotiations in the midst of war and wholly opposed taking any part in the fratricidal killing — at the same time, to our knowledge, no one has been called up for military service from the inner leadership of the Party in power and its satellites (KSZ-MJ, Bunyevac-Bokac Party and Serbian Radical Party) — people who swear by warfare, launch



Detail of the gravure of Gheyn: Mars Asleep, 1630

vicious slander campaigns against the peace movement and boast loudly of their patriotism.

Through this statement we wish to inform the domestic and international community of the discrimination being exercised against the VMDK and its leaders, of the present and likely consequences of the forced conscriptions, and of the persecution campaign being waged against us.

Vajadasagi Magyarok Demokratikus Kozossege (VMDK) — Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina, Ada, 28 January 1992.

### SERBIAN AUTHORITIES ARREST BELA CSORBA

**Bela Csorba** a Hungarian writer in Vojvodina and member of the VMDK's 12-person governing body (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina), was arrested on 7 February for avoiding the draft.

#### Statement by the VMDK:

The Hungarian community of Vojvodina, other peace-loving citizens, and especially VMDK members were shocked and outraged to learn that on 7 February, on a public street in the town of Temerin, police arrested Bela Csorba. Mr Csorba, a member of the VMDK's governing body and President of the organisation's Temerin District chapter, is a noted peace activist and public personality, who serves as responsible editor of *Hirmondo* [Courier], the newsletter of the VMDK.

Bela Csorba had been forced to go into hiding during the past weeks after refusing to comply with a military draft order. Under difficult circumstances and exciting considerable effort, he was nevertheless able to continue carrying out his most important organisational and editorial duties.

His arrest is clearly part of the predetermined military operation by which the Serbian authorities are seeking to destroy the VMDK, by incapacitating the organisation's leaders with the aim of intimidating, breaking and decapitating the considerable political oppositional power represented by the Hungarian community living here. The VMDK — with its resolute peace-seeking positions, long-term perspective and firm commitment to democratic principles — has long been a thorn in the side of the xenophobic tyrants seeking the disintegration of the country.

Aware of our defencelessness — that we are at the mercy of circumstances and that tomorrow new victims are likely to be dragged away from our midst — we protest in the strongest possible terms the shameful political repression of the Hungarian community and the arrest and incarceration of those brave peace activists who dared raise their voices against the war.

**We demand the release of Bela Csorba!**

**We appeal to all decent, democratic-minded individuals and political organisations to protest the arrest and dragging away of Bela Csorba!**

Ada, 7 February 1992

Translated by the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, PO Box J, Gracie Station, New York, NY 10028 (tel: +1 212 289 5488, fax: +1 212 996 6268).

Posted on GreenNet by War Resisters' International (gn:warresisters)

### AMNESTY ACT

#### Article 1

**All persons who, prior to the day on which this act goes into effect, have committed the offense of refusing to answer the summons and avoiding military service as defined under Article 214 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or the criminal offense of unauthorized absence or desertion from the armed forces as defined under Article 217 of this Code, shall be freed from criminal prosecution and punishment (hereinafter: Amnesty)**

Recruits, soldiers and reservists, including many reserve officers, have refused to participate in an undeclared civil war, which was never implied in their oath to defend the country.

A replacement for declaration of war was found in a poorly articulated act by the four members of the Presidency of the S.F.R.Y., which was denied recognition by the international community and did not enjoy any respect at home, either. The semi-secret mobilizations which had been ordered on the basis of such semi-legitimate act were generally disputed and rejected, partly because they implied discrimination against citizens of former Yugoslavia of different nationalities.

Tens, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of mostly young men have fled abroad where they live under difficult conditions, separated from their relatives and their country. Many are in hiding at friends' and relatives' homes as illegals, losing their jobs, interrupting studies and living in constant fear. Which country can afford to deprive itself of the talents and creative contribution of an entire generation of youth? It is not enough that many of their peers went to war, voluntarily or under duress, and suffered greatly therein? Both those groups have been severely damaged.

**We would greatly appreciate your support in our effort to provide Amnesty for those who are hiding or who have been charged with refusing to be mobilized into the armed forces or who have deserted from the battlefield. We ask you to write to the following authorities:**

- The Presidency of the S.F.R.Y., Bulevar Lenjina 2, 11070 BEOGRAD
- The President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr Slobodan Milošević, Maršala Tita 14, 11000 BEOGRAD
- The Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Maršala Tita 14, BEOGRAD

**By the coordinator of the action, Vesna Pešič  
Center for Anti-War Action,  
Prote Mateje 6, 11000 Beograd**



## CROATS AND SERBS UNITE FOR PEACE AGAINST THE WAR IN CROATIA AND THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO THE TERRITORIES OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Mi Za Mir (We For Peace) was established in Amsterdam on 13 October 1991. It is an association made up largely of young Croats and Serbs who have come to the Netherlands, refusing to take part in the present war in Croatia. Its members are generally highly educated and are therefore able to take a wider view of the current situation. They are thus in position to observe developments in the former Yugoslav territories with a certain detachment and objectivity. Mi Za Mir also has a number of active Dutch members.

Those who have come to the Netherlands from abroad have no intention of settling in the country permanently: their stay depends on the duration of the war. They are therefore not seeking political asylum, for as long as they are here, however, they hope to remain together as a group so that they can continue to help one another in finding shelter, employment and food, and provide other forms of moral and material support.

By fostering dialogue, the association hopes to help overcome hatred, which is invariably the worst possible basis for any kind of solution. Mi Za Mir aims to demonstrate that dialogue between Serbs and Croats is possible, and that the two sides can join forces in pursuit of peace.

This dialogue reflects their determination to find a way for Croats and Serbs to live side by side in peace and harmony. Any violent solution to the present situation will simply sow the seeds for further violence in the future. Peace, on the other hand, stems from the recogni-

tion of one another's rights and the desire to live and work together in trust. Besides promoting such dialogue within its own ranks, Mi Za Mir hopes to establish links with the peace movements in the former territories of Yugoslavia and counterpart movements in other countries.

The association will make every effort to safeguard its aims and ensure that it is not used to further political ends.

### Activities

A number of working parties are responsible for a range of activities designed to promote the peace process, and to assist those who have fled the region and ensure that they are able to live in dignity while in the Netherlands.

- A liaison group maintains links with the peace movement in the former territories of Yugoslavia, and helps to publicise Mi Za Mir

- The press committee is responsible for publicity in the Netherlands.

- The women's group addresses the problems faced by women refugees

- The art's committee organises cultural activities

- The legal rights group is attempting to establish the formal status of those seeking temporary refuge in the Netherlands

- The survival group has been set up to welcome and assist those who have fled the region

In addition, the association is organising a course in non-violent methods of resolving conflicts. It is also planning to conduct various sociological and other surveys.

Since its inception, Mi Za Mir has received the support of a number of both Dutch and international organisations. They include the following:

- The working group for women, peace economics and welfare

- The association of Conscientious objectors (VD)

- The International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR)

- Women against nuclear arms

- Women for Peace

- The Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA)

- The Interdenominational Peace Council (IKV)

- Pax Christi

- The Tilburg-Dubrovnik Solidarity Committee

- The Netherlands Association for medical War Studies (NVMP)

- War Resisters International (WRI)

A number of Dutch lawyers have kindly been providing both advice and support.

the association is also able to offer the services of a social worker.

### Target group

Most of those who form the association's target group are opposed to seeking refugee status for the following reasons:

- They regard their stay in the Netherlands as a temporary measure in anticipation of an end to the war

- They wish to stay together as a group in order to support one another and to join forces as part of the peace movement

- They hope to avoid being branded as refugees in the eyes of their compatriots for fear of reprisals on returning to their homeland

- They are not seeking any benefit from the Dutch social security system

They are entirely dependent on third parties for their basic needs.

Mi za mir works closely with Dutch organization of conscientious objectors and also use their office;

contact address:

**Mi Za Mir**  
**P.O. Box 4920**  
**1009 AX Amsterdam**  
**NETHERLANDS**  
**TEL 020-6229954**  
**FAX 020-6652422**

January 27., Mi za mir has organized a multimedia performance in Paradiso, well known alternative center of Amsterdam. Speakers from Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian peace movements were invited and some local radio stations of Amsterdam provided on-line connection with studios of local radio stations from Zadar, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana where more activists were available for discussion.

Marko Hren reported after his visit to Amsterdam: "Mi za mir is currently highly energized. They are just moving into their newly squatted house, constructing their club, bar and dormitories. They are incredible example of creativity and positive vibration - probably a very unique case concerning refugees from former-Yugoslavia. Dutch CO movement played a big role helping Mi za mir to get organized." To avoid spreading only supreme feedback on the group we have to note that they promised an article and photos for this issue of The Intruder. They did not send it yet - probably too busy."

## Cross-cultural Education Against Nationalism

(Short version; a more detailed version is available in German)

By Bettina Gruber and Werner Wintersteiner, Alpe-Adria-Alternativ, Villach-Austria

1. A few weeks ago, in January, Austrian police succeeded to raid up a group of neo-nazies, all well-known people for many years. They found tracts and propaganda-leaflets trying to prove that the holocaust against the Jewish never had happened, but also many weapons for terrorist attempts against Austrian politicians. Up from this moment, a violent debate about neo-nazism started in our country, but it seems to be lead in a wrong way from the beginning. The leader of the Liberal Party, Jörg Haider, is trying to play down the affair declaring that it was only few "crazy" people who are not to be taken seriously. The governmental parties, Socialists and Christian Democrats, on the other hand, underlined that the racist behaviour of Mr Haider's party, shown for example in the propaganda against the immigrants during the electoral campaign in Vienna last autumn or his position towards the Sloven minority in Carinzia, is one of the very origins and the ideological base of nazi's extremists. Both parties, of course, didn't mention their own contribution to the climate in Austria. And if it is true that nationalism is not spread equally in every parties, it is also a fact that it was the government which put the army on the border to stop illegal immigration and there were socialist mayors who refused for the immigrants to stay in their community. Fearing the increasing influence of Haider, the governmental parties started themselves a more or less racist debate, especially during election campaigns.

2. Like in all European countries, East and West, we observe also a wave of nationalism, xenophobia and racism in Austria, "a cry of hopelessness, of rage and hatred" (Claude Julien). Democrats seem to be helpless facing this situation. What are the reasons for the surprising strength of this movement that

maybe has found its most awful expression in the Yugoslav crisis (the only real existing common Yugoslav phenomenon that still exists)? Far from pretending that we can give an exhaustive answer to this question we like to turn the attention to the following points:

- Being afraid of the stranger is, as Julia Kristeva pointed out, the fear of the dark side in ourselves. The influence of nationalism and racism is due to a certain mental structure, "the authoritarian personality", developed by Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno and others. The society's "structural violence" in policy, culture and education, is reproducing this mentality every day. Under certain circumstances, this capacity might be "actualised" - for example when a demagogic leader of an opposition party exploits the failures of the leading democratic parties.

- The actual raise of migration seems to threaten some social classes fearing to lose their social status. Of course, rich countries like ours shouldn't have any problem to solve the problems of both, natives and foreigners, for example to find a flat at a fair price, to get a job with a fair income and so on. But unfortunately, the classical mechanism of transforming social problems into national problems still works. And it works in a very successful way. For intellectuals who are not personally concerned with these problems, it is easy to speak about a multicultural society and to enjoy a larger offer of food, animation, intellectual debates. As long as they don't consider the real questions of the man in the street, their good looking ideas will not be accepted.

- But it is not only the loss of material security, it is more a general instability of values, a lack of institutions that twenty years ago could help to support changes of life but that can't do it anymore: families, churches, parties, associations. In today's Austria, after the end of the cold war, the whole identity of the Second Republic is in question. Austria's picture of itself has only been interpreted in a negative way as neutral between the two military blocks. But now, after the breakdown? Especially young people are very aware of all these problems, and they can react in very different ways, as the examples of young pacifists on the one hand, and young skinheads or neo-nazies on the other hand prove. It depends on their personality and their experiences to which side they incline, and sometimes the two extreme positions are very close to each other.

3. In our region, the so-called Alpe-Adria region (the triangle between Slovenia, the north-western part of Italy and Carinthia-Styria in Austria) these new problems appear mixed with the old problem of national tensions, more precisely: with the difficult relationship between minority and majority in each country. Our region indeed has always been a melting pot of Roman, Slav and German populations, languages and cultures. Unfortunately, we don't have only the tradition of a good neighbourhood, but also of nationalist violence, persecution and war. Some prejudices are still existing, and national minorities have never reached all the rights they are entitled to in any country of our region - and this in spite of many attempts to establish good and intensive relations between the peoples. After the end of the cold war and all the changes happened in Slovenia and Croatia, on the eve of European Union, we are now on a decisive point: if we succeed in overcoming the old and new prejudices in one effort, our region could become a model of interethnic cooperation in a "Europe of regions".

4. To reach this aim and to prevent the expansion of nationalism, we should also consider the field of education. Of course, education cannot repair the failures of policy as it often seems to be expected, and there is no excuse for political omissions. But even if we admit that there have been too many illusions on the influence of enlightening and education, the importance of this sector cannot be denied.

In any case there are things not to be forgotten: school system can also be considered as a part of a system of structural violence both against teachers and pupils. This aspect of the school system should be reflected in any pedagogical process, and teachers should try to democratize as much as possible all their lessons. If intercultural education doesn't pay attention to this point, it hardly can contribute to an emancipating education and diminish prejudices and hatred.

Intercultural education has become an important principle of any education rather than a new pedagogical branch. In our opinion, inter-cultural education is too often limited on relations between minority and majority, or preoccupations with immigrants. The various possibilities of contacts across the neighbouring borders are far from being explored. For this reason, our organisation started a study of intercultural school contacts in the Alpe-Adria region.

## Peace Action in Ljubljana

The candles action has stopped on 20th. January 1992. During the candles action in Ljubljana a number of signatures were collected in support to the campaign of Serbian anti war groups collecting signatures for the referendum against involvement of serbian recruits in war in Croatia.

**Peace Caffe in Ljubljana is going on each wednesday evening.** Activists from various social groups come and meet in one of the most beautiful Caffe - Galleries in the center of Ljubljana. During January and February 1992 the following topics were discussed:

-peace activities in various republics of former Yugoslavia; Howard Clark from War Resisters International reported from his 3-weeks tour around former Yugoslavia (see his report in Peace News /January 1992/ published in London. More than 50 local activists were present.

-voluntary work with refugees in Slovenia. Volunteers working in refugee camps reported on their activities, particularly on an international working camp held in one of the two refugee centers in Ljubljana during Christmas and New Year ( Further activities were announced, particularly a work camp for refugee children planned for May 1992.)

-a discussion about Slovenian identity crisis was moderated by Božidar Slapšak

-education for primary school refugees was discussed with local authorities of Slovenia

-involvement of women groups was discussed and a number of women peace groups participated in the discussion. It was agreed that the next issue of The Intruder will include a special dossier on involvement of womens' groups in former Yugoslavia during the war.

-activities of Croatian peace movements were discussed and Zoran Oštrič from AntiWar Campaign from Zagreb was moderating the session, presenting also his observations from his 2-weeks travel around former Yugoslavia at the beginning of February 1992.

The two following Peace Caffe sessions will present: conscientious objection in Slovenia and activities of Sarajevo peace groups.

## LETTER OF INTENTION

To social movements worldwide

From AntiWar Campaign Zagreb/ Croatia and

Coordination of Peace Initiatives Ljubljana/ Slovenia

### Evaluation

Yugoslavia was a focus of European public during the last six months. We are impressed on the level of responsibility of civil society and we deeply appreciate the consideration and support which involved a large spectrum of groups and individuals from all over the world. We think it is time for a short reflexion and evaluation of six months cooperation in the region of extremely hard conditions and trauma. We have faced difficulties in communications and specially the difficulties deriving from the fact that international community could hardly adopt to the fact that realities in yugoslavia have to be observed as different, from each other and that they can not be approached with simplifications and generalizations. Together with these difficulties we gained a lot of experiences. The crisis in Yugoslavia was a good test for all of us.

### Good Will

There is no doubt that incredible amount of good will to contribute positive energy in the time of crisis was shown by social groups in Europe and wider. Several groups did work for dissemination of information, several researchers, journalists and activists came for a visit to study, learn and report back home, we have performed quite some trainings for our activists and a number of speakers tours were organized for us all over Europe. Many people have been fund rising or contributing funds for these projects, some technical equipment has been transported for our movements into the region.

### Good Intentions and sometimes bad results

Evaluating international activity in the region (Slovenia and Croatia) we came to a conclusion that we can divide inter-

national presence into two categories:

1. people who come for too short period of time for what they expect to get
2. people who are willing to dedicate enough time to learn, help or understand

Time dedicated to the visits has proven a crucial factor for the success of the visits. We discovered, that we were happy and felt fulfilled after the visits of people (journalists, trainers, volunteers) who stayed with us enough time which enabled us to listen to each other, understand experiences of war, perceive the analysis of the conflict and accept the political proposals we have. There was never a problem with such visits. They all proved constructive, we developed new friendships and long term projects.

On the other hand there were some cases of "instant" visits where visitors expected much from us (in organizational terms), but offered very low degree of readiness for listening or had almost no time to listen. This particularly applies to "peace caravanes" when a large number of people travelled through former Yugoslavia having very short stops in major cities - which gave us a lot of work but very little results. In some cases we strongly felt a notion of peace tourism or peace safari amongst visitors. This kind of actions were usually not planned in cooperation with local groups but exclusively from abroad and we were put in a position to "host" them.

To emphasise our intentions and priorities for the future and to decrease the misinvestments of time and energy we suggest the following principles for the activities in the regions of crisis:

1. projects should be carefully planned and prepared in cooperation with local groups
2. enough time should be assigned for desired goals to be fulfilled
3. the number of people coming should be corresponding the aims of the mission, each one in a team should have

his or her place and role in the mission. (i.e. for the purpose of facts-finding & information small groups are desired to arrive for longer period rather big groups for short period of time).

4. at least some preparatory work should be done before people actually come to the region, or preparatory meetings should be planned for the very first days of arrival to the region.

### Intentions and priorities

We are aware of the fact that long term work after major hostilities will end will be needed in the region, specially to promote reconciliation and trust building and to work with traumatised people who suffered repression or war treatment (more than 1/2 million people were displaced until now the number of victims is estimated to be around 50.000 and great majority of people in our regions are or were suffering from the psychological trauma of war because of political and military threats). Our aim is to build infrastructure for long term work and to educate a number of people who will dedicate themselves to work in the field of popular education for peace and reconstruction.

To fulfill this goals we ask you to cooperate with us on the following points:

1. disseminate information concerning our work, analysis and visions, organizing speakers tours in your regions, translating our material, distributing our papers in English etc.
2. help us build infrastructures, offices, working camps etc.
3. perform trainings and education for our activists and for affected people directly (nonviolence, group work, conflict resolution, local organizing, de-traumatization....)
4. voluntary work / we need experienced people to work with us on long term: international communications, editing, education, work with refugees etc.
5. humanitarian aid /collecting and distributing/.

Ljubljana, Zagreb, January 1992

The Movement for The Culture of Peace and Non-violence in Ljubljana has initiated in August 1991 a proposal to establish electronic communication between peace groups emerging in Yugoslavia. The idea presented at several international meetings was then taken by German peace groups and Eric Bachman got fully involved in fundraising and technical preparations. During Christmas he travelled around former Yugoslavia and provided several groups with modems and technical information. Here is a short report on the Email peace-services.


The main idea was to connect existing Bulletin Board Systems in former Yugoslav republics (ABM-BBS in Ljubljana, Sezam in Belgrade, Rhinocerus in Novi Sad, MIPS in Zagreb, Peace News in Belgrade, etc.), and through these BBS services provide a permanent link between existing peace centres (Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Anti War Committee, Zagreb, Center for Anti War Action Novi Sad and Belgrade, Center for Peace, Sarajevo etc.). All kind of local users could then use local BBS systems and access peace conferences for public use. Further more, a central node (ABM BBS in Ljubljana) would provide a link to AdriaNet and to APC through GreenNet.

### Basis

AdriaNet is the biggest existing net of BBS nets from former Yugoslavia with ABM-BBS being its strongest developing center. AdriaNet serves several thousand users. It is connected to FidoNet (international BBS network) and DecNet (national academic community network of VAX users). The operators of ABM-BBS are committed to peace movement and will

## Electronic Communications & Anti War movements in former Yugoslavia

Report



Konrad Klapheck

ing to serve to its communication needs. (See the letter by Boris Horvat, manager of the ABM-BBS). There are technical possibilities also in other major towns - i.e. Belgrade, Novi Sad, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje, Split). Eric Bachman visited some of those centres during his mission from 26. December to 4.

January. His goal was to make connections with the local BBS systems and to establish basic electronic connections between BBS and peace groups.

What follows is a report of the first phase of the work done by Eric in Ljubljana, suggestions and budget for the second phase and perspectives for the third one.

### I. phase - report

A high speed modem was installed in ABM-BBS center in Ljubljana and connection with GreenNet was established. ABM-BBS has established a public peace conference "PeaceNews" which is already transmitted regularly to AdriaNet members. There are also special conferences like "HelpCroatia", "HelpSerbia" and "HelpSlovenia" which are dedicated to the particular problems of these areas. During the visit of Eric B. a (limited access) conference "PeaceGroups" for the peace groups was established.

Four lines are currently available by ABM-BBS. Three more are planned - peace movement in Ljubljana has significant support of the local PTT company.

A low speed modem was installed in the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana and the communication with ABM-BBS established. Modems and software were supplied by Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (Eric »

Bachman).  
Viv Kendon (APC - Green Net) has enabled the contact to APC through the GreenNet. Significant support was offered from various sys-ops of mail boxes in Germany. Special thanks to Bionic.

Budget of the First Phase was  
8950 DEM

### II. phase total budget estimated 13.000 DEM

To operate the established links, the following installations are most urgent:

0. Harddisc & controller for the mail box (1 GB)
1. Connection to APC through Green Net
2. Connection between BBS systems in different republics
3. Visit and instalation two weeks and travel -Eric Bachman

### III. phase - dreams

- APC charges
- high speed modem for Zagreb and for Belgrade BBS
- establishing direct link to international computer networks (X.25 or DATEX-P). Peace group in Ljubljana will try to get partial sponsorship of local PTT company. The cost of connection is 15.000 DEM.

This report and budget proposal for the next phase of the project was drafted during New Year Hollidays. In the meanwhile, the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana has established its Email address that can be accessed from any other Email network

EMAIL: MIROVNIKI@uni-lj.ac.mail.yu

You can access PeaceGroups Conference dialing directly to ABMBBS in Ljubljana and leaving a message for SYSOP:

Dial: +38-61-218663, +38-61-154270 or +38-61-154156.

AT the moment peace groups outside Ljubljana did not get used to use their equipment but we hope they will do it soon. For more details, please get in touch on the above addresses.

Financial support for the upgrade of peace-email-service in yugoslavia should be directed to Bund fur Soziale Verteidigung, Germany (ring Eric Bachman +49-5221-65485) for more information.

By Marko Hren

# PACIFISM

By Nenad Zakošek, Zagreb

How I understand the Peace Engagement in Croatia today

Since I met Christian, a radical pacifist from Berlin and now a good friend of mine, at the beginning of eighties, I became aware of the complexity of the peace issue. Through the dialogue with him, I realized that many apparently self-evident arguments which justify or advocate the solution of conflicts by means of violence are questionable. It was of special significance to me when I recognized that, on the basis consequent ethical argumentation, we can justify a right of an individual, who consciously accepts his obligation as a citizen (i.e. the obligations deriving from his membership within a political community, a state), to refuse the military "patriotic service" - as long as he fulfills an adequate civilian substitution for this obligation, in order to prevent the violation of the principal of equal civil rights. Thus the right of a state to impose certain obligations upon its citizens is rendered only relative status and is limited by the individual choice based on conscience (by the way, it should be mentioned that during the eighties this understanding gained the official support of the United Nations). This clearly demonstrates that fundamental human rights put a limit to "patriotic obligations". But what I never could accept in this dialogue was the attempt to postulate an absolute ethical value of peace and out of this to derive an unconditioned refusal of any violence. It always seemed to me that peace as an ethical value must be judged in combination with at least one other value, individual and collective freedom. I understand that we should try to avoid violence, but not if the price should be the loss of our freedom. This problem becomes even more drastic if we are confronted with the violence of totalitarian regimes. **Methods of civil disobedience and civilian resistance may be successful against the violence of a liberal-democratic state which respects the rule of law, but not against a totalitarian aggressor**



**or authority whose violence arises from a completely circular, autistic ideology** (i.e. an ideology which is totally deaf for arguments of other ideological and ethical positions). **In other words, it was possible for Gandhi's Indian national movement to attain its goal through non-violent means against the British colonial authorities whose inner structure remained basically liberal, but Czechs were completely helpless with their non-violent civil disobedience against the fascist occupants in 1938 and against the communist occupants in 1968.**

All these basic dilemmas also appear in special form in the case of the war in Croatia. It's beyond doubt that the primary cause of violence (not only in Croatia but in the whole Yugoslav area) is the two-headed totalitarian Moloch: the national-communist regime of Slobodan Milošević, supported by the authentic and aggressive Serbian national movement on the one hand, and the stalinist military junta which mobilized incredible destructive potentials (accumulated during many years) on the other. The fatal mixture of these two totalitarianisms (the Serbian national-communist and the Yugoslav-stalinism) also produces a double threat against freedom: in the first place by violating elementary liberal rights of the individual (evidence for this is above all the poor state of human liberties and rights in Serbia itself), but also by oppressing collective liberties of all non-Serbian nations in Yugoslavia, which was brought to the extreme in the war not only against the Croatian republic but also against the Croats (having in mind

# PATRIOTISM

the danger of political instrumentalization of the war and violation of individual rights and liberties. The present ruling political party in Croatia, the media under its control and a part of the intolerant public opinion are trying to mobilize undifferentiated patriotism. In this manipulative way they attempt to identify the particular party rule with the political community of all citizens, i.e. the state as a whole. **The overwhelming accent on achieving the independence of the Croatian state is constantly being used for derogation of civil and political liberties. Both political manipulations are extremely dangerous, not only for Croatia as a political community but also for the effectivity of its defence against external aggressor.** It must be clear that in contemporary Europe, Croatia will not be able to constitute itself as a state, nor will it achieve its internal and external security, if it won't protect the free space for civil and political liberties of its citizens.

**Therefore I think that peace engagement in Croatia, above all, means struggling:**

- against the militaristic illusion that the war can be finished through a glorious victory of Croatian army
- against pogrom-like inventing of enemies and undifferentiated "patriotic" mobilization.

- for full political and ideological pluralism within boundaries of constitutional order (which means that no individuals can be stigmatized only because they don't satisfy some arbitrary measure of "patriotic spirit".

- for individual right of choice which is different from the position of the present authority (i.e. the ruling party), including the right to refuse military service in accordance with constitutional and legal procedure (this right must be guaranteed especially in the war, of course under condition that the individual fulfills a different kind of obligation towards the community)

- against the illusion of Croatian national egoism that the Croatian question can be definitely solved without a peaceful and democratic solution of the position of all other national communities in the Yugoslav area.

**Without a liberal and democratic Croatia (and this is where Croatia really has the key position in the Yugoslav area) there will be no breakdown of Serbian totalitarian illusions nor any peace in the area. To struggle for peace in Croatia means to help the attainment of this aim.**

(first published in Croatian in Ark' zin)



Cover of Ark' zin No. 2 - 3

several cases of arbitrary massacres against Croatian civilians, especially in rural areas under Serbian occupation). In this situation it is the right of individuals and of the collective to protect themselves against the totalitarian threat also by violent means. Because of this it can be said that Croatian state is fighting in a justified defensive war.

But if it is so, then what can be the meaning of the peace engagement in Croatia today? I am convinced that it is not only legitimate but also very necessary, from the aspect of pacifist as well as libertarian values. a defensive war can be easily turned into an instrument of particular political interests and into a pretext for limitation or derogation of individual liberties. The main purpose of peace engagement in Croatia I see above all in the attempt to prevent this development and thus help to end the war as soon as possible.

The situation of war in Croatia is particularly aggravated by the fact that simultaneously a new political community - the new Croatian state - is emerging. This fact obviously increases



## NONVIOLENCE AND PATRIOTISM

By Marko Hren



**Nenad Zakošek**, a member of Anti War Campaign from Zagreb had started a discussion about patriotism and pacifism in his essay published in **ArkZin** no. 3., a publication of Anti War Campaign in Croatian language. **The Intruder** is republishing the whole text and here follows a reflection by **Marko Hren** from The Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana.

Two questions seems to be (re)open in the essay of Nenad Zakošek. One is concerning the legitimacy of armed resistance and the other is concerning the "patriotic" mobilization.

### Legitimacy of armed resistance

The dilemma concerning the efficiency of nonviolent struggle against totalitarian regimes - arguing that Gandhian strategy was applicable due to liberal-democratic nature of British authorities - was presented very often in Slovenia after the June 1991 events. Nenad Zakošek clearly states that: "*In this situation (i.e. war in Croatia) it is the right of individuals and of the collective to protect themselves against the totalitarian threat also by violent means. Because of this it can be said that Croatian state is fighting in a justified defensive war.*" The "right to protect ... against ... with violent means" will be not put under question here. What I

want to discuss is the choice certain society has concerning the means of their struggle.

When Slovenian civil society was struggling for human rights in the late 80-ies it consciously decided that the struggle will be nonviolent. There was a strategy and means were carefully chosen and reflected. The basic mean was public work and dialogue with all parties involved. The movement confronted the very same totalitarian regime, which was at that time already producing visible threats. Those threats were originating from federal military bureaucracy and were directed against democratization forces in Slovenia. The price that the movement was willing to pay was equal to the goal that the movement wanted to achieve - human rights and democracy. If the movement would lose the level of both human rights and democracy would be reduced. And the movement had won. The energy of the movement was then taken by forces which had as a goal to create an independent (not to be confused with "separate") state. These forces were struggling for a form of state and not for the quality alone. The price they were willing to pay was more and more unlimited and accordingly also the means to achieve the goal became unlimited.

The efficiency of nonviolent struggle can not be approached without reflecting the goals of the movement (campaign, struggle etc.) and the price it declares to be willing to pay. It is important to say, that human rights and democracy movement was only willing the very freedoms of people involved, while nation-state-building movement was willing to risk the lives of everybody. The movement for HR further mobilized people according to their free will while the later is mobilizing people according to a law of "national duty" and according to the principle of patriotism. Gandhi spoke about convertibility of means and ends and further, about nonviolent means and nonviolent ends. When the ends become exclusive (prioritising one nation for example) also the means degenerate.

It can not be therefore simply concluded, that Gandhian strategy could not be efficient in the cases of Slovenia after elections or Croatia during 1991. (Such

conclusion was made by slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek in July 1991 further concluding that Serbs are not British Gentlemen). The alliance of Milošević (serbian president) and Jović (military general and federal presidency leader) can of course not be compared with British government and any of its Viceroys who had to deal with Gandhi, as well as the path of Tadjman (croatian president) can not be compared with Gandhi's rich philosophical and practical references to nonviolence (Tolstoj, links to British conscientious objection movement, experience in South Africa etc.). Gene Sharp - while analyzing Gandhi as a Political Strategist - comments on the dilemma of "British gentlemen" as follows: "*If the British exercised restraint in dealing with the non-violent rebellion, this may be related more to the peculiar problems posed by a nonviolent resistance movement and to the kind of forces which the nonviolent action set in motion, than to the opponent being 'British'. The same people showed little restraint in dealing with the Mau Mau in Kenya, or in the saturation bombings of German cities.*" Furthermore, history remembers British treatment of Indians with quite a reference to brutality used.

Gandhi himself provides a good link to the dilemma discussed in the essay of Nenad. Gene Sharp writes: "In late 1938 and early 1939 Gandhi appealed to Jews in Germany to resist the Nazi persecutions by nonviolent resistance. From October to December 1938 - after the Munich Agreement (30 September) and before the full German occupation of Czechoslovakia (late March 1939) - Gandhi appealed to the Czechs and Slovaks to resist with his technique of struggle". Gandhi wrote: "if they (Czechs) had known the use of non-violence as a weapon for the defence of national honour, they would have faced the whole might of Germany with that of Italy thrown in.", and further "If the Nazis come to India, the Congress will give them the same fight that it has given Great Britain. I do not underrate the power of satyagraha..."

### Patriotic mobilization and nationalisms

The patriotic mobilization is dangerous as much as it is framing cosmopolitan thinking into nation-state identification. The defence concept of Gandhi was understood as "defence of national honour" and was based on a complex philosophy of nonviolence behind. The defence of honour with nonviolent

means is limited to struggle for ones own identity. It is self-promotive. The defence which includes violent means is always projected to a struggle against another identity. It is mutual-destructive and perpetuates the presence of xenophobia and ethno-centrism. Nonviolence requests strong individual will and is therefore based on individual. Armed resistance requests strong subordinative system and is denying individual. Armed resistance is in long run contraproductive simply because it provides ground for militarization.

A pacifist who founds him/herself in a climate of patriotic mobilization is therefore confronted with a basic task - to remain individual. As individual I supported and was fully involved in Slovenian struggle for human rights and for national identity. I was involved to contribute the vibration of nonviolence and peace politics and besides, I was convinced that struggle for collective rights (cultural, minorities, national, regional etc.) are a legitimate process in liberation of peoples, even-though myself personally would declare as cosmopolitan and would never feel no other (regional, racial, cultural, religious, national or whatever) identity but the one of human being and religious seeker. This attitude produces another schizophrenic contradiction: cosmopolitan personality can be caught in a corner between justification of liberation struggle and patriotic mobilization.

Travelling abroad coming from "a new nation-state" we found ourselves often confronted by two types of reactions: -those who expres congratulations for independence of Slovenia (and some of them even for the "war" victory) -those who blame for Slovenian secession (sometimes expressing it with cynical statement "now you have got your own state"). Both presume that people coming from mentioned regions have some patriotic feelings. The latter even presume that everybody is a nationalist simply because he or she comes from a region which just struggled for its national liberation. I argue with both. Everybody is of course responsible for what happened, but I do not feel responsible as Slovenian - I only feel a fundamental responsibility as a human being who is involved locally as well as globally.

The argument with the former starts with assumption that there is really nothing to be congratulated for. The war is one big disaster and failure of all

of us - nationally and internationally. The result of mal-processing the transition period is bad and no-one can be proud of that. The creation of some kind of patriotic pride because of independence is morbid. Yugoslavia dissolved and Slovenia became independent because of the failure of all diplomacies (Slovenian, yugoslav and international) and not because of Slovenian diplomacy being successful. The war is a failure of a nation and can not be converted into pride. We could have been proud if we would have avoided the war, violent nationalisms, separations and devastations. The use of violent means is producing long term multiplier effects. I never dreamt of Slovenian state, my blood has quite some anarchist colour and my soul is gipsy. Slovenian state does not mean anything else to me but -as all states do - an obstacle: new borders, new limitations, new frustrations of my friends travelling from abroad, new frustrations of my closest friends at home who have to wait and plea to obtain Slovenian citizenship. I would be proud of the region, of the culture and of the state, only when it would be modest, open, demilitarised and friendly. But it is not the case really. It includes quite some elitist, xenophobic, militarised and frustrated elements. More than ever since I remember.

The argument with the latter produces a defence of "Slovenian thing". The conflict was not due to Slovenian nationalism or at least can not be assigned to slovenian nationalism primarily. We should not under-estimate the fact that the core problem of societies caught in Yugoslav pot was the existence of ideological military apparatus which depended entirely on Old Yugoslavias' ideological doctrine. The problem of Yugoslavia was the one of militarised state and militarised society. Projecting the problem to ethnical and national questions alone is blinding as well the understanding of the militaristic doctrine being now incarnated in national states - which inherited militarism simply copying it into their new political realm. Since the issue of militarism of Yugoslav state is usually not taken as a major source of the conflict it is also easy to understand that people - to which this paragraph refers - do not understand the antimilitaristic arguments. It is to object (re)militarization of Slovenia and it is to defend elements of peace politics which (quite a number of them) were exercised during the transition period and during the war being later systematically denied by federal authorities (remember that Slovenia has

offered the contract of confederation or a contract for the union of sovereign states to all former Yugoslav republics even still in May 1991), and it is to defend the right of people in Slovenia to decide on what form of relations they will create with their neighboring societies. I'm again and again shocked with this category of international observers who are so blindly rejecting any positive aspect of national struggle. Sometimes they appear to be more xenophobic than "ordinary" nationalist.

National identity is a reality. If some people do not have this identity it is fine. Many of us do not hang on it either. But people have right to identify with their nation and have right to be patriots. Finally, those who condemn so much the independence of Slovenia are often expressing quite violent pro-Yugoslav (patriotic) feelings. Any addiction with states is illusion. The question of good or bad nationalisms does not play much importance but it is to be aware of the fact that nationalism is a strong identification which has to be approached with full sensibility and attention. Glorifying or discrediting it are both equally contraproductive. Patriotic mobilization did not only affect people locally but also international community. Most of people home and abroad are taking sides -for one (Yugoslav) or another (small state) patriotism. And I understand more and more the good old slogan "state is shit". Ram would say: "I want to get a little bit outside".



Photo from the film Gandhi of Richard Attenborough

## THE WAY TO STOP THE WAR IS IN PEOPLE'S HANDS

interview with Howard Clark, coordinator of WRI office in London by Antiša Korljan

Howard came to former Yugoslavia with one and only aim: to meet different peace groups and initiatives in this part of the world through impartial eyes. We bring you some of his impressions...

Howard, first of all, what are your impressions on the situation here, considering you were on both sides, Serbian and Croatian, as well in other republics of former Yugoslavia?

H. C. : Well, I arrived, together with a Hungarian, an Austrian and a German WRI members, in former Yugoslavia in Novi Sad, Vojvodina<sup>1</sup> on the twentieth of december 1991 and I visited peace groups in various places. I spent quite some time in Belgrade, I visited Pančevo<sup>2</sup>, I went to Sarajevo<sup>3</sup>, Priština, where I met Kosovo Albanians<sup>4</sup> and I was also in Ljubljana and Zagreb. After this tour I can say that the situation is completely different in each republic or autonomous province. In Novi Sad I met Nenad Čanak, a leader of the League of Social Democrats in Vojvodina. He was arrested after his involvement in peace rallies in towns with Hungarian majority and later sent to the front. This event really gave me some directions to understand the situation in Serbia. There is also a problem of national composition of troops of federal army. Namely, it seems that about 80 percent of those conscripted to take part in federal army, are from Vojvodina. According to Nenad's story, there is also enormous amount of alcoholism among these soldiers and this a problem that society will have to cope with very soon.

In the last two or three months in Serbia grew an initiative for a plebiscite, on which citizens would decide whether to send Serbs to war out of the republic or not. One hundred thousands signatures are needed and the state would be forced to issue the writs for the plebiscite. H. C. : I think that this is a remarkable action. The fact that people have to give their identity number when signing the petition means that they really have to make a great psychological step. Namely, most of the people of former Yugoslavia have never had to stand up for their beliefs. Now, for the first time in their lives they are making a declaration of opposition to their government and I think that the fact they already got two thirds of required signatures is a remarkable achievement.

How do you feel about peace groups

and movements in Serbia?

H. C. : I was quite encouraged by them. You have to know that the climate in Serbia is very hostile, you can actually feel the spirit of militant nationalism, but in spite of that almost every night there is some protest event. What is more important, the idea of pacifism is spreading to other towns in the middle of the land like Požarevac, which is Slobodan Milošević's hometown. or Kragujevac, what is really significant, this spreading. Assuming that the war will continue and that people will get a clear picture of casualties that war has caused, these initiatives will start to organize themselves and there will be very strong antiwar campaign there.

You used the form "when it happens". Does that mean that in present Serbia there is no organized peace movement?

H. C. : **The anti-war movement is still somewhat marginal in the Serbian society.** The peace groups are very active, but resistance to military service is largely taking the form of more or less spontaneous acts of resistance. There are lot of people coming back from the front and refusing to soldier on; there are people who refuse to go there for the first time and so have to hide from Military Police. But this resistance is not really organised yet. **The social and economical cost of the war in Serbia mean there is tremendous potential for revolt, but it is not clear whether this discontent will be manipulated to strengthen Serbian nationalism or alternatively become a base for anti-war action. The people of Serbia are not used to organising things. In the past they were used to being organised and manipulated by others.**

After your tour, what will WRI do on organizing peace groups? As you certainly noticed, the official politics as well as public opinion in Serbia are very



militant and, as you put it, very hostile. H. C. : The first thing I was saying on the trip and will say repeatedly is that people have to realize that the way to stop the war lies in their hands. No action can be taken from the outside without their cooperation, so it is really up to them to make a political step they were not used to do. If there could be events about the war like last march<sup>5</sup> it could be very helpful. So the first message to them is: **"Don't look for deus ex machina from the UN or EC, look to yourselves!"** The practical project that WRI will take up now is to get somebody from the United States, probably a Vietnam veteran, who has become an antiwar activist, to come and tour Serbia, Vojvodina and also Croatia. **You have to know that United States lost 58000 men in battles in Vietnam, but since then over 60000 veterans have committed suicide in the USA.** The war had an enormous cost, not just economically, but also psychologically and socially. And that is what Serbia is facing now and I think they are not ready to handle it. So we think that bringing somebody to tell people: "Look, we had our war. It did not just traumatized us, the war was wrong and we are going to oppose it for the rest of our lives" could be very helpful. And this message, I think, will be very important and will have real echo there.

One the last question, what are your impressions on relations between the state and these representatives of civil society?

H. C. : Civil society is such anew phenomenon here that the rulers have no respect for it yet. They are also not aware of its potential power either and I think this is a lesson that the rulers of Serbia or whatever emerges out of it will have to learn. Civil society can actually restrain them in their behaviour, but civil society has also to learn that it does not have just power to do that, but also responsibility to do that.

<sup>1</sup> ex autonomous province, which is now included into republic of Serbia. About 30 nationalities live there, Hungarians are in majority.

<sup>2</sup> a small town near Belgrade

<sup>3</sup> capital of republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

<sup>4</sup> Kosovo is also an ex autonomous province, now included into Serbia. Albanians make a great majority there.

<sup>5</sup> Serbian opposition made a demonstration in the center of Belgrade because they wanted democratic and impartial media. Army troops interfered and one person got killed

## SNAPSHOTS OF LIVES APART

### Reporter's notebook

By Marisa Crevatin, in Sarajevo

**Living together.** Visiting Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reporter faces the eternal dilemma of whether reality is better comprehended by an outsider or an insider. The question is especially fraught here. Five days in this region - this "beautiful country, intriguing and not at all ordinary", as Ivo Andrić put it - I decide to bet on the insiders. From my perspective, that the living together of these people who represent the three largest Yugoslav nations of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, has vanished, gone as if it never existed. Could an insider find where it has disappeared?

"Disappeared" - people answer with resignation, whatever their nationality. Detailed discussions convey the differences between them. But there remain similarities: they all hope that, when the nightmare is over, life will resume its familiar course, and they will rediscover this living together.

**Herzegovina.** The area of this region is not vast, but its history is. The divide here is between Christians: Catholic/Orthodox, Western/Eastern. In the post-war period, people in western Herzegovina, mostly Croats, emigrated to western European countries, especially Germany. Those in Eastern Herzegovina stayed at home. Now they are two worlds.

In the West, we are told to go East to see the Chetniks. From federal army and Serbian sources we hear about the "concentration of the Ustashe's paramilitary forces" in the West. On a sunny Sunday, driving through the Neretva River valley, we see nothing unusual, not even armed guards between Croat and Serb villages. We pass through vineyards, home of the famous Zilavka and Blatina. Will there be a vintage next year?

**The army.** Yugoslav People's Army, Serbo-Communist Army - different names for one military force. In one version it is the legitimate protector of unarmed people facing genocide. In another, it is an occupying force. Army troops have begun to withdraw from Croatia toward B-H. Some say the people's army has to stay somewhere. Others

say it is just transplanting its occupation.

In Mostar, reservists from Serbia and Montenegro were brought in more than two months ago. A young woman tells us of uncontrolled shootings, provocations, harassments. We don't hear the opposite view. But the Army's assertions reveal deep tensions between it and the local citizenry.

**Political parties.** Three parties - SDA, SDS, and HDZ - share the power. Do they share the people? "Bosnia-Herzegovina is an indivisible, sovereign state to its citizens," says, Alija Izetbegović, president of the republic and head of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), says, "The peoples of the Bosnia and Herzegovina don't have to live together. They can live in parallel, just one (group) next to another. The plebi-



Sarajevo

scite of Serbian people has shown its will to stay in Yugoslavia and does not accept a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina". Stjepan Ključić of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) says, "Unfortunately, Serbs and Croats have to live together".

**Europe.** Lots of talks. People ask, "Why isn't Europe more grateful? Doesn't Europe see that we defend it against the Bolsheviks?" says one. "When they arrive at Trieste it will be too late". Others make the same argument, but warn against religious fundamentalists. The most reasonable people just wonder, "When will the blue helmets arrive?"

**The media.** Well known Belgrade writer Philip David once said, "Every bullet shot on the battlefield was preceded by a word shot in the media". There is not yet real war in B-H in part because there is no media war here. The press does its best to steer clear of the war-mongering typical in Belgrade or Zagreb. President Izetbegović says the media's success in retaining professional standards will help B-H avoid

bloodshed. Who wants to disagree with him? It is a hopeful consolation amid bad news.

**Making a Living.** Geography is a thing of great importance in B-H. Almost everyone displays his charts, making out old lands, new borders. Every nation has its own colour, showing that the forests belong to one nation, ores to another, and to a third - God knows what. But if the resources are divided, what are the people going to do for a living?

December 1991, first published in Yugofax.

## Out of Press Review THE WEAPONS MARKET

The extension of the war in Croatia was felt in a much stronger way in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in any other republic. The population knows that they can become a target at any time. The weapons' market is in great extension on all the Yugoslav territory, and Sarajevo is one of its centres. In the Stup's quarter, in front of the cafe Evropa, it is possible to buy guns for a range of prices, from 1000 and 2000 DEM. (Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1992).

The supply of weapons is achieved through national ways. The Federal Army, massively present on the territory, is providing the Serbian population; Croats are helped by the diaspora, and indirectly by Germany, Austria and Hungary; Muslims are helped by Turkey, Iran and Libya, through the axe Istanbul - Novi Pazar (Sandžak) - Sarajevo.

According to certain informations, lot of Bosnians personalities (managers, parliament and presidency's members) would be involved in this market, whether nationality they have. (Vreme, 16th of December 1991)

An armed confrontation between the three ethnies in this republic would quickly take the aspect of a religious war. It seems that protagonists and the international community is shaking when thinking of this possibility. Nevertheless, the 10000 Blue Helmets due to come to ex-Yugoslavia are not supposed to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina!

## THOSE WHO ARE VISIBLE, AND THOSE WHO, FOR THE MOMENT, ARE NOT

Report from Zagreb, by Yasmina Kuzmanovic

B o s n i a

### "WHY" she asked

Commentaries from  
people in Sarajevo

#### Mirko Škerbić

Ph.D. Professor of Electrical  
Engineering, University of Sarajevo

Because for years, values have been destroyed, and the system of standard world values has not been supported—first of all with regard to the work. The perfectly conceived system of self-management in practice created false values, so that nonobligated-negative parties have brought us to our present situation.

#### Aida Softić

Gynecologist

Because we are artificially restricted in our social and intellectual development, and because we are constrained within narrow limits which are preventing us from self-development, and obtaining the ability to overcome the identification of ourselves through national and nationalistic feelings. So, the consequences for the children, family and the whole society are horrible, and the proof of this is evident in our country.

#### Indira Haračić


Clinical psychologist

Although we have spoken a lot about unity, it is obvious that it does not exist strongly enough to confront all the powers of evil and hatred. It is obvious that we have not overcome the "Balkan" syndrome, and the past is still dominant in our lives.

#### Predrag Finci

Ph.D. Professor at the Faculty of  
Philosophy

Freedoms are possible only as real freedoms; life is really possible and it is life only as free life. The question about the right to life and the question about the right to freedom are questions about the same thing.



Henry Chartier - Bresson

#### Missing persons

Ljubica Oleski is looking for her 19 years old brother Zeljko, who disappeared during the compulsory army service in Serbia. She last heard from him in August. Rade Brakus is looking for his mother, from the Croatian town of Drnis, which was occupied by the Federal Army in September. Marija Papac is still looking for her father Nikola, a native of Vukovar, missing since August.

Since the first blood was drawn last Easter, the war in Croatia has claimed many thousands of casualties. Zdravko Tomac, the Vice-President of the Croatian government, recently estimated the figures to be in excess of ten thousands. Throughout these months of war, there have also been isolated reports of Croatian soldiers and civilians being taken as Serbian prisoners, or simply left behind in the occupied territories, **but nobody expected the number of missing people to be so high.**

"At this moment we estimate that there are more than 30,000 people missing in Croatia, based on the requests for tracing that their relatives have put to the Croatian Red Cross", says Dubravka Horvat, chief of the Red Cross tracing agency in Croatia. The Croatian agency is part of the Central

Tracing Agency within the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

All our local chapters have been literally buried by citizens searching for missing members of their families, and we still don't have complete reports from Slavonija, let alone Vukovar", says Miss Horvat. At this moment the number of refugees in Croatia has reached 700,000. That means we are talking about over half a million people who are on the move. **What lies behind the staggering number of people who have been reported missing?**

"Some of them are Croatian soldiers missing in action, some are Croatian citizens lost during their regular service in the Federal Army, but the majority of missing are civilians", according to Bosiljko Missetic, the Croatian minister of justice. "You read about them in newspapers after each wave of enemy aggression. A report usually goes: it is suspected that a number of inhabitants of so-and-so village have remained in the enemy area, and their fate is unknown."

**Of course, nobody knows exactly what has happened to the missing people.**

"We speculate that the majority of them are held **as hostages** in the areas temporarily out of reach of the Croatian authorities", says Missetic, "which means

that they are captive in one of the Serbian or Army prisoners camps on Croatian territory, like Knin, Manjaca, or Samarica, or that they have been taken to camps in Vojvodina". **According to Missetic, many of the missing have been killed:** "I just talked to a refugee from Glina; he told me that they are not able to identify and bury the bodies of Croatian men, women and children, which they find near the occupied villages."

**"The worst thing about missing people is the uncertainty"**, says Ivan Gradisar of the Zagreb Red Cross chapter. A woman who has searched for her son for three months, who was reported missing in action, said: "I would rather know he is dead, than not know what has happened to him". She was one of the lucky ones, for last week her son arrived in a group who had been exchanged for Serbian prisoners of war.

For a nation of 4.5 millions, the number of 30,000 missing people in only five months of war is very high. "We fear that this figure is just a conservative estimate", says Ivan Gradisar, "individuals and whole families can actually be missing, but if nobody starts a tracing procedure with the Red Cross, then they will not be registered as such."

**As with so many things, the real number of missing people will only be clear after the war is truly over, with the help of census and voting registrations.**

#### The displaced

According to Croatia's Office for refugees, about 650,000 people have fled from their homes in Croatia. Out of this number, 322,745 refugees have found shelter in Croatia, and 1,060 persons have fled from Serbia to Croatia. Most of those refugees are Croats, but there are also Serbs and Hungarians.

141,000 people have fled to Serbia, about 95,000 to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at least 22,000 to Slovenia. Hungary has provided shelter for 45,000, Austria for 50,000, and Germany for 5,000 refugees. These figures are those reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

"They shot at us", said an eleven year old boy from Jukinci, a village near Glina in eastern Croatia, describing the events from last September. "At night, when the shooting had ceased, my mother led us out of the house. My sister, mother, uncle and me started to run, followed by several other people

from the village. I was terribly afraid. We walked for about 20 kms through the woods. The next evening in the village of Pokupscko, Croatian police picked us up and helped us to Zagreb.

A family from the town of Vinkovci near the Serbian border had to leave their home after the fall of Vukovar. "We left our house after the last army attack with mortars", said Danijela Krivic, a 30 year old economist. "We could't take it any longer. We have a nine months old baby. The Serbian village of Mirkovci, the base of Serbian terrorists, is very near, and for days there was constant fire. My kid was crying all the time." Danijela is now staying with relatives in Zagreb, but neither she nor her husband know when they will be able to return home. **Independent or not, Croatia is still at war. Most of the now desolate territories are occupied by the Serb-led federal army, and many Croatian villages have been levelled to the ground.** The Croatian government has a strict policy on this issue; territories have to be reclaimed and refugees returned to their homes. But nobody knows how or when this can happen.

This article has first been published in  
Yugofax-3 February 1992

## CROSS THE FINGERS, EVERYTHING IS GOING TO BE ALRIGHT...

One decisive week in Slovenia: 7th of February - 14th of February.

By Dominique Cochard

A kind of storm devastated the refugees' centers of Ljubljana during the last few days. As many people decided to go back to Croatia in January, it was expected that all the refugees who decided to stay in Ljubljana (not believing in a stable peace in Croatia) would be gathered in the same camp. Against all our expectations, the government decided **last Friday** for Vič, whereas Šmartinska was the biggest, nicest and most organized center. **On Monday** the official voice announced that, finally, no refugee will stay in Ljubljana: they should be sent to Karavanke (at the Austrian border) where they would share some barracks with workers. **On Tuesday** decision was made that the destination should be Bagnola.

Goga Flaker, coordinator of the voluntary work in the camps up to now, went to the Šmartinska's center **on Wednesday**, date of departure for

Bagnola. She reported: Going there, I was expecting a lot of animation. People packing, about to leave, usually generate a lot of noise, movement... and anyway children are always around.... As soon as I entered the building, I have been shocked by the silence, as if there was nobody left. I went to the meeting room for volunteers, and I found them crying. I had to retain myself not to be caught by the emotional intensity, not to cry myself. I understood how much these young people have got involved with the refugees, how personally committed they were. Then, the busses for Bagnola arrived.

**The people came down very quietly, in extreme silence. Resigned. Nobody said a single word, except one small boy, just before entering the bus, who glanced at Nataša (one of the volunteers) and added: "cross the fingers, everything is going to be alright..."**

Finally, **at the end of this week** the Slovenian government considered again the possible locations of refugees' camps on its territory, and decided it was better to keep one in Ljubljana. The exact place still hasn't been defined. **Maybe on Monday....**

February, Saturday 15th






photo Lina Louhimies

## EXPERIENCES OF 3 DUTCH VOLUNTEERS

**Gert-Jan Rietveld  
Jan-Willem Menkveld  
Anneloes den Mengst  
HAVING WORKED IN  
A REFUGEES' CENTER  
ŠMARTINSKA, LJUBLJANA  
December 21st-January 3rd**

The strongest way of working-aggression I could see was a kind of turning-back in themselves

Children moveable, pulling at your clothes, pushing you sometimes to the limit. Some refused to eat. Little boys playing sometimes "man-like" behaviour.

The experience of working with refugees from Croatia has given me a starting-point for the lessons I give in schools on mutual understanding and peace, in the field of UNESCO. Being confronted with war, destruction and blind hate has taught me to cope with it concretely, instead of giving informations based on prejudices spread by newspapers.

*The workcamp was organised in cooperation by  
MOST-Aškerčeva 9  
61000 LJUBLJANA  
Tel. 3861-217113- Fax. 3861-153304  
For the international aspect and  
Association For Preventive and Voluntary Work-Linhartova 13  
61000 LJUBLANA  
Tel. 3861-129141/234  
For the internal aspect*

"In the heat of this war the Dutch televisionmakers broadcasted a lot of pictures. Now it has faded away, there seems to be peace?"

To speak with these refugees, or more, to build relationships, although it was in a short time, changed really something for me."

Parting after 2 weeks was not easy. I left the center with mixed feelings: I could go home, but how would their lives continue?"



photo Natalia Pennanen

## DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND V I S

By Tonči Kuzmanić

*Updated informations and plans concerning the project run by The Peace Institute in Ljubljana and announced in the previous issues of The Intruder 3*

The main presuppositions concerning the project were:

**1. the occupation** of the island by YPA (YPA was without interruption on the island since september 1943; the occupation of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) is presently characterized by the independence building processes in Croatia after the "elective fall" of socialism), and regarding to the war situation in Croatia, **the expectation that YPA would try to stay on the island** at least one year.

**2. the endangered young Croatia** state was in a position of having to defend extremely large frontlines throughout the previous Yugoslav state, so as a result, we could expect that **Croatia as a state should not have opportunity or even power to liberate the island.** Any step towards the military "liberation" should mean ecological destruction of the island as a whole.

**3. relatively strong interests** concentrated in Italy and European Community to demilitarize the Adriatic Sea in which the island Vis play an important role due to its high level of militarization.

As a consequence of these presuppositions we thought of a **full or complete demilitarization**. As a matter of fact, this was based on the premises according to which we expected that the concretization of conflicting interests around the island would result in a sort of **"self-blocade of interest" or a situation in which "total" demilitarization should become feasible.**

However, it seems that some events are going on quite differently. The last informations from the island (having daily contacts with people from Vis), and my visit there at the end of December 1991 (where I gave lectures on demilitarization), let us believe that the processes for the retreat of YPA are starting. YPA is removing the weapons meant for the training of ex-Yugoslav troops, but not the ones assigned for the "real defence" of the island. Namely, the island was an important training center, especially for navy artillery, for different sorts of military exercises, manoeuvres.... But simultaneously, among the last informations are data about new missiles coming into. In

other words, **the last events could be interpreted in two basically different ways: first, as a real retreat** (officers' families already left the island, including the ones in which the wife was from the island), **secondly, just as temporary retreat** due to the YPA needs of weapons at other frontlines in Croatia and elsewhere. During the last days of 1991, there were negotiations between YPA and the Croatian government (maritime minister) on the island. The official report mentioned "the withdrawal of YPA".

Anyway, it looks as if the disentanglement would be the absence of more or less desired "self-blocade of interest" in which total demilitarization seemed possible. In other words, we should turn to a specification of a more concrete project based on relatively different assumptions. First of all, we should start from the position of "partial" or "possible" demilitarization in connection with the more than probable **presence of newly founded Croatian Navy.**



### What does it mean?

Our previous aim of total demilitarization is still remaining, but with important corrections. If, in the previous concept, the concrete circumstances would have allowed the realisation of the project at once, abruptly, now we should search for successive projects, for a step by step action leading to total demilitarization sometimes in the future. In other words, we face a completely "normal" and "usual" situation in which we are forced to start from the very beginning, from the "point zero".

### What should be done?

The first step should be similar as it was in the previous concept: setting up the international committee for demilitarization of the island. Second step: the efforts towards the installation of the peace office, third one: setting up a ground for the future peace training camp, schools and other peace infrastructure on the island. Shortly, the idea is the "occupation" by different peace activities of those spaces which, perhaps, would be abandoned by

the army.

Our present intentions are as follow:

a. **Discussion dedicated to the present situation as such.** The main problem is the fact that Croatia and YPA (so the island too) are still in war or, at least in semi-war situation, in which circumstances are **changing from day to day.** For example, observed from today's point of view, it seems that the solution for the island vis might not be possible before a solution to the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one among the most important problems within the complex and complicated Yugoslav conflict net.

b. Discussion about the **concrete operationalisation of the institutionalisation** (international committee for demilitarization of the island) of the project as a European project, as a common project of different peace movements, organisations and individuals interested in this kind of civil action, peace research and non-violent conflict resolution.

c. Forming the **peace-office** on the island, concretisation of the tasks for that "working-place"

e. Discussion about the sub-project dedicated to **the peace camp with first international peace camp action this summer on the island...**

f. Establishing the **list of tasks for the future**, timetable of actions, and coordination.

Unfortunately, we still don't have the possibility to contribute to your travel costs, but -as it was underlined in the previous letter- we still can compensate with sea food and the beautiful nature of the island. The strongest moral and material (financial) support up to now came from the German Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie. Mr Klaus Vack informed us that, besides 3000 DEM dedicated for our mailing, telephone costs, first travel expenses..., **a committee for the support of the project of demilitarization of the island Vis was established in Germany**, with important members such as prof. Dorothee Solle, Peter Hartling, Dieter Lattmann, Gudrun Pausewang, Jens Reich...

**The very beginning of the project should be a peace conference on the island at the beginning of April, 3rd-5th of April 1992.**

Please, let us know if you intend to join us, as soon as possible.

Contact directly:

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LJ.AC.MAIL.YU

# CONFLICT RESOLUTION

## WORKSHOP

IN

## YUGOSLAVIA

21-29 MARCH

The Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, an affiliate of Harvard Medical School at the Cambridge hospital, Massachusetts, USA, addresses the psychological and social forces that fuel the major threats to global survival - regional and international conflict and environmental destruction.

One of the Center's key program areas is its **international program on Resolving Group Antagonisms**, which is working to promote the growing field of **Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR)**. ICR is distinguished from traditional efforts in diplomacy by: its emphasis in transforming adversarial relationships into more cooperative ones; its sensitivity to social and psychological dimensions of conflict; its attention to basic human needs; and its promotion of collaborative problem solving.

The Center has the project to run a conflict resolution workshop in Yugoslavia, in which participants will have an opportunity to experience different approaches and techniques used in Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR). **ICR has been used in a variety of ethnic conflicts, including Northern Ireland, The Middle East, Lebanon and Cyprus. It is a form of collaborative problem solving which places emphasis on transforming adversarial relationships into more cooperative ones, is**

**particularly sensitive to social and psychological dimensions of conflict, and pays close attention to basic human needs, such as security and identity.**

The workshop will strive to create an alternative framework for interaction, based on the ICR principles. This includes: valuing listening over confrontation; assuring "safety" and confidentiality; and encouraging voluntary participation.

**The workshop will be a participatory demonstration**, not a training program, nor a conflict resolution workshop per se. While a short workshop like this cannot be expected to resolve deep seated, long standing conflict, it is hoped that the workshop experience will give participants the opportunity to better **understand each other**, to begin to **transcend stereotypes** that fuel enmity, and to **consider options** which are not readily apparent in the polarized political discourse.

This workshop might best be viewed as an initial phase of a larger process. In the final segment of the workshop agenda we will be evaluating what has been presented and discussing possible next steps and future activities. Such activities could include: setting up consultation to workshop participants engaged in ongoing activities; arranging a follow-up more indepth, ICR training program; or planning a conflict resolution or problem solving workshop. For sure additional ideas will be generated at the workshop.

The participants (around 30) should be people with particular interest in conflict resolution or crisis management work who plan **to use the approaches**

**introduced in the workshop in some concrete way:** local community leaders, people from media, active members of Peace centers....

The four members of the facilitation team will be:

- **Dr. Paula Gutlove**, director of the center's *Project to Promote Interactive Conflict Resolution*. She has facilitated dialogue in workshop settings, particularly with international physician groups, in the Soviet Union, Japan, Australia, Sweden and Europe. Dr. Gutlove is a Research Associate of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age and has a faculty appointment at the Harvard Medical School.

- **Ms Eileen Babbitt** is Associate director of the center's *Project to Promote Interactive Conflict Resolution*. From 1989-1990, Ms Babbitt was a Jennings Randolph Peace scholar at the United States Institute of Peace, working on a study of mediation in international conflicts. Ms Babbitt has extensive experience in facilitating and mediating public policy disputes and has also facilitated several interactive conflict resolution interventions with Israelis and Palestinians.

- **Mr Joseph Montville**, a former US career diplomat, is a project director in the Center's *Resolving Group Antagonisms* program. He has had considerable experience as a facilitator in Israeli-Palestinian-Egyptian workshops and with eight of the diverse Muslim and Christian factions in the Lebanese civil war. He has also worked with Sinhales and Tamils from Sri Lanka; Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; black, Asian and white South Africans; and various Eastern European ethnic groups representatives.

- **Dr Lynn Jones** is a British psychiatrist currently living in the United States as a fellow of the MacArthur Foundation, writing a doctoral dissertation on the "Psychology of Political Activism". She has formal training in both cognitive and behavioral psychotherapy, and is experienced in both individual and group work, with an emphasis on systematic family therapy.

### Schedule:

- March 21-22: Subotica
- March 25-26: Ljubljana
- March 27-29: Zagreb

# War in the Media: The Yugoslav Case

The draft project has been prepared by: mag. Sandra Bašić, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana  
mag. Vlasta Jalušič, Peace Institute, Ljubljana

From the beginning of the eighties Yugoslavia has been going through an intensive process of disintegration.


The social system, which has been keeping its legitimation over the past decades with a very strong symbolic identification, with the production of the enemies (external or internal), nonrational relationship to its own history and economical and political inefficiency, is trying to-day to reintegrate by using the military power. Chronologically, after the death of J.B. Tito, the events in Kosovo, the discussions on the issue of economic and political crisis, up to the "Slovenian spring" and an open war conflict, the Yugoslav Army plays a very important role, being at the beginning a very strong factor of imaginary identification and becoming at the end the factor of real disintegration.

Within this period, the media have been shaping their own, specific position. At the beginning of the eighties the media became an element of the national consolidation (Serbo-Slovenian differences on how to solve the economical crisis, that developed into conflict between the nations), the middle eighties mark the strengthening of the media investigative function (revealing of political, economical and military scandals); the situation that has been defined by its own protagonists as "media war".

**The research project is based on the analysis of the process of "media war", the media in the war and the use of media as propaganda machine.**

We will try to define the disintegration of the system by applying three fields of analysis, that are closely related to:

1. Disintegration in the political sphere (collapse of the socialist ideology, one-party system and the supranational state...);
2. Economic disintegration (collapse of economic system, hyperinflation, unsuccessful programmes of economic development, demand for market economy...);



3. The disintegration of the symbolic world (lack of moral values as a result of disintegration of the old symbol world, while the new one has not been built yet, the role of Yugoslav Army, the reconstruction of the history, the analysis of the collective memory, the analysis of canons and conversion, the first indispensable to strengthen the national identity, and the second to define the changes in the social biography...)

### A. Definition of the analytical field

How does the "war in media" function, why we could speak about war propaganda in ex-Yugoslavia and in which cases? Which role did the media in ex-Yugoslavia play in the construction of war and enemy-images, in the reports of war events? These are few main questions we want to open and try to analyse with the project "war in the media". Our aim is not to ask ourselves which are the causes and direct motives of war in ex-Yugoslavia, but to analyse the ways of media transmission, construction of events connected to war in this area. Our analytical field is media in some parts of ex-Yugoslavia and its influence on the mass perception of reality.

At this stage of the project we can include media (press and television) of three republics from ex-Yugoslavia (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia) and, partly, one (also by its name) Yugoslav television network, broadcasting from Sarajevo (Bosnia and Hercegovina).

Included will be press as well as television. There are three research groups (each one from 4 to 6 researchers) taking part in the project, each one from them in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.

### a. The main issues to explore would be the following:

- building of mass psychology (press, tv)
- transmissions of special forms of key politicians public appearance (press conferences and key speeches); when, at what occasions they appear, how often, for how much time, etc. (especially TV, also press)
- war reports (propaganda-antipropaganda)
- the relationship between media and peace initiatives, movements, their appearance in the official media
- building of special channels of informations from the side of peace initiatives (bulletins, "live" news in the street...)

- the position of media in law (as background), official censorship

### b. The selection of media, we want to analyse:

The selection is in the case of Yugoslavia one of the most complex tasks and very important point for making possible the comparison among all milieus. In the selection we have to consider the following circumstances:

- different general situations in different republics
- different influences of some typical media at the public opinion
- different methods of censorship or different means of political influence on the media (including different positions of media in law)...
- special media blockades all over ex-Yugoslavia

Despite some difficulties we finally decided to include television as the most important media for the production of images into the analysis. There will be analysis of all three republic televisions plus special phenomena of YUTEL. From the press we will choose only the newspapers which have a significant influence on the public opinion plus some special cases.

**B) Research procedures and analytical means**

- a. content analysis and analysis of single media interventions
- b. analysis of discursive formations, if possible
- c. the analysis of media images

We see two possible ways how to perform content analysis: either to choose, to define some key events in the last period or to choose one important period in the development of the last years. The first one would be more appropriate, especially because of controlling the whole and possible avoiding of too large extent of the project.

There is twofold task with the definition/choosing of events: **1.** national/republican important events, **2.** all-yugoslav important events, **3.** events of international importance for the foreseen extension of the project to some neighbouring countries of Yugoslavia. On this ground we would be able to compare the effects, images and to make common conclusions. Accordingly, there would be three levels of research and results: the first, important and explicative first of all for the national/republic milieu, the second one, explicative for the all-Yugoslav milieu and the third one, which would have the over-Yugoslav importance.

It is necessary to enable both the possibility for each group of researches to have enough space to analyse the phenomena they consider important and to enable the concentration on the importance of common results. Therefore it would be appropriate to choose (for the last two levels) only the events all three groups will consider as important for the analysis, which could be called the method of minimal consent.

The analysis of media images would concentrate on different symbols systems, the relation to the history, rationalisation repetition of historical events, the image of the war in media, the image of the enemy...



METELKOVA NETWORK: what about the future?



Ex-military buildings in Ljubljana. Empty. (photo Igor Omahen)



M'zin is a Slovenian cultural magazine with an unusual, one-and-a-half-year-long history. In the beginning it was fanzin, with an aim to be "a voice of Metelkova Network", the association of more than 700 hundred members - mainly artists - who are fighting for the idea of revitalizing (meanwhile already) ex-military buildings in Ljubljana with culture. With an enthusiastic editorial-team, which met through

Metelkova at the beginning of 1991, has started a new, ambitious period, in which M'zin became, step by step, an important, recognized and by readers well accepted "general culture" magazine: general public as well as professionals. M'zin is opened to all fields of art, to an established as well as to an independent cul-

ture. Besides information, commentary, interviews and critics, it concentrates also - in order to create better conditions for artists - on problems of culture marketing. The fact, that the magazine has no significant financial support from government or any other institution, means, that the magazine is completely independent. This "independence" represents various difficulties, especially, because of smallness

# MZIN

of Slovenia (in total 2 mio of people, cca. 2000 readers of M'zin), so that any sponsorship is always very wellcome.

We are also looking carefully to open and create through our media new relationships with foreign countries, especially in Europe. We are already in close contacts with Czechoslovakia, especially with artists and organizers in Brno and Prague. In Prague we cooperate with Linharts Foundation, prob-

ably the most interesting and ambitious cultural project and "crossing" in that part of Europe. Linharts Foundation has in M'zin its own permanent column. M'zin is not only the magazine; it represents a growing space where artists from everywhere meet and create, so that became an important point of information, happening and development of culture in Ljubljana.

In next few month we plan the first international issue of M'zin, which will present some of the most interesting cultural projects in last few years in Slovenia and offer useful information on where and how to contact artists and cultural institutions there. If you would like to get it, please contact us at the address: M'zin, Kersnikova 4, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenija (phone: +38-61-224-666). We expect, that the price for the issue will be 5 DEM.



GRAFFITI at Ljubljana river: yes or no







photo Borut Krajnc

SLOVENIAN ATHENS: the big exhibition on iwell-known subject of "the man with the seeds", happened in 1991 in Modern Gallery in Ljubljana in cooperation with many Slovenian and Yugoslav artists



Ferus Mustafov; macedonian musician was the big suprise and the star of Ljubljanas' audience at DRUGA GODBA (=another music) in spring 1991; DRUGA GODBA is probably the best music festival in Slovenia. (photo M. Mrčun)



Alan Hranitelj is known as one of most interesting young fashion designers in Slovenia (photo Jasna Rajh)

**THE INTRUDER**  
 is looking for a native english speaker  
**VOLUNTEER,**  
 preferably a man (as our office is crowded by women, it is needed to create a gender balance)  
 Typing and correcting would be tasks of high priorities and of absolute necessity.  
 Nevertheless, participation in the conception, writing, investigating... is offered and even wished.  
 The volunteer would have the opportunity to work both in **Zagreb and Ljubljana**. In Zagreb, his job  
 will consist in working on Data Base and international relations.  
 All applications to be sent to:  
**The Intruder**  
**Center for the Culture of Peace and Non-violence**  
**Mestni trg 13**  
**61000 LJUBLJANA**

A SPECIAL ISSUE OF INTRUDER SHOULD BE PUBLISHED IN MAY  
 WITH THE FOLLOWING FOCUS  
 Subculture in Slovenia, from 80ies to 90ies  
 Women in Yugoslavia

**A NEW PUBLICATION**  
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 Are issuing

**YUGOSLAVIA:  
 DISINTEGRATION  
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